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DEMOCRATIC DISSOLUTION:  
RADICAL EXPERIMENTATION IN STATE 
TAKEOVERS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 
Michelle Wilde Anderson∗ 
ABSTRACT 
While state interventions to stabilize the finances of struggling mu-
nicipalities date back to the Great Depression, the current fiscal crisis 
has brought a startling escalation in the powers granted to state inter-
vention authorities.  Aptly observed by Abby Goodnough in The 
New York Times, cities and states have tried “myriad ways of righting 
their fiscal ships as the recession plods on,” but until very recently, 
“locking the mayor out of City Hall [was] generally not one of 
them.”1 
In 2010 and 2011, Michigan and Rhode Island, which have been 
watched closely by other states, dramatically reformed their laws gov-
erning state receiverships for local governments in fiscal crisis.  The 
new legislation provided for suspension and displacement of local 
government in faltering cities during the period of intervention, re-
placing all elected local officials with a single state appointee.  Such 
interventions leave the legal corporation of the city and its budget in-
tact: the city’s borders do not change, regardless of the revenue po-
tential and service costs of that land base, and the city must pay its 
own bills.  Yet the city’s power to govern that territory and budget is 
drawn up to the state’s executive branch.  The city’s elected officials 




 Assistant Professor of Law, UC Berkeley School of Law.  Richard Briffault and 
other participants at the Cooper Walsh Colloquium, as well as Andrea Peterson and 
Eric Talley, provided wise comments and questions.  I am also grateful for research 
assistance from students Liz Kim and Lisa Nash, librarian Dean Rowan, and statisti-
cian Su Li; assistance with manuscript preparation from Leslie Stone; and student ed-
iting from the Fordham Urban Law Journal.   
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This Article analyzes the new state receivership legislation in Mich-
igan and Rhode Island and offers the concept of democratic dissolu-
tion to help interpret this new development.  While the new laws are 
premised on a genuinely urgent and difficult public policy problem—
local governments overwhelmed by debt they cannot service and bills 
they cannot pay—this Article argues that the reforms do both too lit-
tle and too much.  To cure the underlying structural causes of fiscal 
crisis, the laws do next to nothing; to improve local management, the 
laws enact a punishing cancelation of local democracy.  For Michigan, 
Rhode Island, and the other states watching them, I propose legal re-
forms that more moderately balance the seriousness of the challenges 
of local fiscal stabilization with the importance of local democracy. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A haircut still looks a lot better than a beheading. 
Robert G. Flanders Jr., state-appointed receiver of  
Central Falls, Rhode Island2 
Democracy, the governor seems to suggest, is something [poor and 
minority cities] can’t afford. 
Rainbow PUSH Coalition3 
 
 2. Tad Friend, Letter from California: Contract City, When a Town’s Budget 
Fight Turns Deadly, NEW YORKER, Sept. 5, 2011, at 35. 
 3. Commentaries: Michigan’s Governor Tramples Democracy, RAINBOW PUSH 
COALITION (June 28, 2011), http://rainbowpush.org/commentaries/single/michigans_ 
governor_tramples_democracy; see also Rick Ungar, The Michigan Monarchy Legis-
lates Financial Martial Law—Nation Yawns, FORBES (Mar. 18, 2001), http://www. 
forbes.com/sites/rickungar/2011/03/18/the-michigan-monarchy-legislates-financial-
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Fiscal crisis is generally described in numbers.  Here are a few from 
the city of Benton Harbor, Michigan.  More than 48% of its residents 
live below the poverty line,4 compared to just 7% in St. Joseph, Ben-
ton Harbor’s sister city across the river.5  Formerly a thriving indus-
trial hub for the region, Benton Harbor saw the rapid flight of thou-
sands of white families and jobs from the 1960s to the 1980s.6  Today, 
the city is 91% black.7  St. Joseph is 88% white.8  At least five decades 
of bitter race relations separate the cities sometimes known to each 
other as “Benton Harlem” and “St. Johannesburg.”9  The number one 
attribute promoted on Benton Harbor’s website is the city’s status as 
an enterprise zone.10  St. Joseph, by contrast, self-describes as “a 
growing resort community” that is “nestled on the southern tip of 
 
martial-law-nation-yawns/ (calling Snyder’s law a “shocking, Draconian, democracy-
destroying measure[]”).  
 4.  See Benton Harbor, Michigan—Selected Economic Characteristics: 2006–
2010 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU [herein-
after Benton Harbor Economics Census], http://factfinder2.census.gov/faces/nav/jsf/ 
pages/index.xhtml (Quick Start search: topic “DP03” for “Benton Harbor city, Mich-
igan”; follow “2010 ACS 5-year estimates” hyperlink). 
 5. See St. Joseph, Michigan—Selected Economic Characteristics: 2006–2010 
American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU [hereinafter 
St. Joseph Economics Census], http://factfinder2.census.gov/faces/nav/jsf/pages/index. 
xhtml (Quick Start search: topic “DP03” for “St. Joseph city, Michigan”; follow “2010 
ACS 5-year estimates” hyperlink). 
 6. History, CITY OF BENTON HARBOR, http://www.bentonharborcity.com/history. 
htm (last visited Mar. 27, 2012); see also Jonathan Mahler, Is There Anything Wrong 
with This Economy that a Jack Nicklaus-Designed Golf Course Can’t Fix?, N.Y. 
TIMES (Dec. 18, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/18/magazine/benton-harbor. 
html?_r=2&partner=rss&emc=rss (describing the history and current demographics 
of the city). 
 7. Benton Harbor, Michigan—Profile of General Population and Housing Char-
acteristics: 2010, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU [hereinafter Benton Harbor General Profile 
Census], http://factfinder2.census.gov/faces/nav/jsf/pages/index.xhtml (Quick Start 
search: topic “DP-1” for “Benton Harbor city, Michigan”; then follow “2010 Demo-
graphic Profile SF” hyperlink).  
 8. St. Joseph, Michigan—Profile of General Population and Housing Character-
istics: 2010, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU [hereinafter St. Joseph General Profile Census], 
http://factfinder2.census.gov/faces/nav/jsf/pages/index.xhtml (Quick Start search: top-
ic “DP-1” for “St. Joseph city, Michigan”; then follow “2010 Demographic Profile 
SF” hyperlink). 
 9. See ALEX KOTLOWITZ, THE OTHER SIDE OF THE RIVER: A STORY OF TWO 
TOWNS, A DEATH, AND AMERICA’S DILEMMA 29–32 (1998).  Kotlowitz’s book pro-
vides a historical account of racial tensions between Benton Harbor and St. Joseph 
told through the lens of a 1991 murder of a black teenage boy. 
 10.  History, supra note 6; Business, CITY OF BENTON HARBOR, http://www.bent 
onharborcity.com/business1.htm (last visited Mar. 27, 2012). 
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what has been termed ‘The Riviera of the Midwest.’”11  A March 2011 
audit estimated Benton Harbor’s debt at $6 million—quite a figure 
for a city of just over 10,000 people.12  Deepening the fiscal crisis, ap-
pliance maker Whirlpool Corporation announced layoffs in 2011 of 
5,000 employees, many of whom worked at the company’s world 
headquarters in Benton Harbor.13   
The number three is now important in Benton Harbor as well.  As 
a result of a law passed in 2011, the City Council is now limited to 
three powers: calling council meetings to order, adjourning meetings, 
and approving council minutes.14  The authority, substance, and pro-
cess in between—setting the meeting, proposing agenda items, de-
termining policy, and managing operations—all lie in the hands of the 
city’s “emergency manager,” a state appointee.15  Under the 2011 law, 
when the state places a city in receivership because of fiscal distress, 
the emergency manager assumes the responsibilities of all elected of-
ficials for the city.16  In addition to functionally firing elected officials, 
the 2011 law gives emergency managers significant new powers.  Most 
notably, they can now break existing collective bargaining agreements 
and other contracts, negotiate and approve any future agreements on 
the city’s behalf, and ban the city’s entry into new collective bargain-
ing agreements for up to five years.17  They can also privatize the city 
for the long-term, if not permanently, by contracting out for services, 
selling public assets, and cancelling local programs. 
 
 11. Tour of St. Joseph, Michigan, CITY OF ST. JOSEPH, http://sjcity.com/inside.php 
?a=PG:123 (last visited Mar. 27, 2012). 
 12. Brandon Lewis, Audit Finds City of Benton Harbor $6 Million in Debt, 
WNDU.COM (Mar. 8, 2011), http://www.wndu.com/politics/headlines/Audit_finds_ 
City_of_Benton_Harbor_6_million_in_debt_117564384.html; Benton Harbor Gen-
eral Profile Census, supra note 7.  
 13. Tony Spehar, Whirlpool Layoffs Worry Nearby Businesses, ABC 57 NEWS 
(Oct. 11, 2011), http://www.abc57.com/news/local/Whirlpool-Layoffs-Worry-Nearby-
Businesses-131544803.html; Mae Anderson, Whirlpool to Cut 5,000 Jobs to Reduce 
Costs, YAHOO! FIN. (Oct. 28, 2011), http://finance.yahoo.com/news/Whirlpool-to-cut-
5000-jobs-to-apf-3248783307.html. 
 14. Emergency Financial Manager Takes Power, Raises Tempers in Benton Har-
bor, MLIVE.COM (Apr. 19, 2011), www.mlive.com/news/grand-rapids/index.ssf/2011/ 
04/emergency_financial_manager_ta.html; see also Kevin Lewis, Update: Tempers 
Flare at Benton Harbor Commissioners’ Meeting, WNDU.COM (Apr. 19, 2011), http: 
//www.wndu.com/localnews/headlines/Benton_Harbor_commissioners_meeting_coul
d_be_a_heated_one_120067674.html. 
 15. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 141.1515(4) (2011). 
 16. See id. 
 17. Id. § 141.1519. 
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Michigan’s law is similar in key respects to a new state receivership 
law passed in Rhode Island in 2010.18  The new laws in Michigan and 
Rhode Island represent a major change from older models of state 
receiverships, in which states generally granted emergency bailout 
funding in exchange for local consent to the appointment of state re-
ceivers, and these receivers then guided financial recovery planning 
alongside local officials.  Breaking with these models in the name of 
fiscal exigency, Michigan and Rhode Island now permit a state takeo-
ver without bailout funding or local consent, and they dramatically 
increase the powers granted to emergency managers. 
 The new laws suspend a city’s charter and its sitting government, 
imposing the authority of the state through an appointee of the gov-
ernor.  A legislative sponsor of the Michigan bill thus referred to the 
legislation as “financial martial law.”19  A more precise description of 
the new statutes is, in my view, “democratic dissolution”—that is, 
changes that suspend local democracy, even though the city remains a 
legal entity.  For an unbounded period of time, a city’s corporate sta-
tus is held in place while its charter and system of government are re-
placed by a single official acting with unprecedented authority, discre-
tion, and autonomy.  This unusual combination means that the re-
receiverships dissolve democratic self-rule for the city, but not in a 
way that changes the taxable land base of the city or the service needs 
of its population.  In other words, local power is absorbed by the state 
but the local budget is not—the struggling city must continue to sus-
tain the costs of an independent municipal government (including the 
emergency manager’s salary, staffing costs, and administrative ex-
penses) through revenues collected locally.  Whereas a true dissolu-
tion removes a locality’s borders and thus merges its land base and 
people with a larger county or township government, a democratic 
dissolution preserves the municipal corporation but suspends its gov-
ernment. 
This Article analyzes the state receivership laws in Michigan and 
Rhode Island, using the concept of democratic dissolution to interpret 
these recent developments.  While local fiscal crisis is an urgent public 
 
 18. See R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §45-9-3 (West 2011). 
 19. See Chad Selweski, Michigan Senate Passes Emergency Manager Bills, 
MACOMB DAILY TRIB. (Mar. 10, 2011), http://www.dailytribune.com/article/2011/03/ 
10/news/303099968/michigan-senate-passes-emergency-manager-bills (describing a 
comment by Republican state senator Jack Brandenburg that emergency managers 
“will be deployed in communities that need ‘financial martial law’”).  Critics of the 
laws might prefer the phrase “colonial rule,” a useful framing offered by Richard 
Briffault as commenter on this Article at the Cooper Walsh Colloquium. 
ANDERSON_CHRISTENSEN 7/11/2012  8:19 AM 
582 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXIX 
policy problem for which there are no painless remedies, I argue that 
Michigan and Rhode Island have failed to enact effectual reform.  In-
stead, they answer crisis with an extreme centralization of power that 
fails to restructure or rebuild the city’s finances and management over 
the long term.   
The clear message of these laws—that it is only local government 
management that stands in the way of solvency—is a gross oversim-
plification of the causes of fiscal decline. Centralization of power by 
the state on these terms does not ameliorate structural causes of fi-
nancial distress, like concentrated poverty, the loss of middle-class 
jobs across a region, or local borders that fragment a single metropoli-
tan area into socioeconomically segregated cities.  Indeed, local dem-
ocratic dissolution may only exacerbate fiscal malaise over the longer 
term by facilitating changes (like the abrupt sale of public assets) that 
produce quick returns at the cost of permanent sustainability.  Along 
the way, radical state takeovers can enflame antagonism between 
state and local actors, further disempower a beleaguered local elec-
torate, and dramatically undermine the transparency and accountabil-
ity of local governance.   
The consequences of these reforms matter nationally because sev-
eral other states where municipalities are mired in debt and deficits 
are watching Michigan and Rhode Island.20  Indeed, a bill borrowing 
elements of the Michigan law was passed in Indiana in March 2012.21  
For all of these states, I offer legal reforms to better address the seri-
ous challenge of local fiscal stabilization while upholding the virtues 
of local democracy. 
I.  THE NEW GENERATION OF STATE TAKEOVER LAWS 
Compared to collective bargaining reform efforts in Wisconsin, the 
Michigan and Rhode Island laws went into effect with little public at-
tention beyond the states’ borders.  Yet they were not unnoticed; in-
deed, Michigan’s reforms attracted attention from the likes of Steven 
 
 20. Similar changes may be under consideration or in development in Wisconsin, 
Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and other states. See Rick Ungar, Gov. Scott Walker Re-
portedly Planning Financial Martial Law in Wisconsin, FORBES (Apr. 16, 2011), http: 
//www.forbes.com/sites/rickungar/2011/04/16/gov-scott-walker-reportedly-planning-
financial-martial-law-in-wisconsin; Initiative 1: Create a Statewide “Local Govern-
ment Flexibility Toolkit,” MAKE IT YOUR MILWAUKEE COUNTY, http://makeityour 
milwaukee.com/the-initiative/create-a-legislative-toolkit-for-true-long-term-change 
(last visited Mar. 27, 2012) (seeking financial stress test legislation). 
 21. See HB 1192, 117th Gen. Assemb., 2nd Sess. (Ind. 2012), available at: http:// 
www.in.gov/legislative/bills/2012/HE/HE1192.1.html. 
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Colbert and Rachel Maddow.22  Maddow commented, “this could be 
the most important and most under-covered story of the year.”23  To 
introduce these laws, this Part describes their scope and structure and 
situates them in the context of other laws that address local fiscal cri-
sis. 
A. An Introduction to State Receiverships 
Three categories of laws have evolved to address municipal fiscal 
meltdown: (1) traditional creditors’ remedies, i.e., state mandamus ac-
tions to compel increased taxes for payment of debts, which can be 
organized and enforced through a judicial receivership; (2) municipal 
bankruptcy under Chapter 9 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, if the state 
permits its municipalities to so file; and (3) state municipal insolvency 
laws, in which the state stages an intervention in the municipality’s af-
fairs.24  In the third category, intervention may be ad hoc or provided 
for under general state municipal insolvency legislation.25  Such inter-
vention is commonly called a state receivership.26 
The Michigan and Rhode Island statutes fall in the third category.  
Laws permitting state intervention in the finances of struggling mu-
nicipalities have been on the books in most states since the Great De-
 
 22. See, e.g., Michigan’s Emergency Manager Law Disenfranchises African-
Americans, MADDOW BLOG (Dec. 8, 2011), http://maddowblog.msnbc.msn.com/_ 
news/2011/12/08/9311633-michigans-emergency-manager-law-disenfranchises-african-
americans (emphasizing the racial demographics of the cities selected for interven-
tion); The Colbert Report: The Word—Autocratic for the People (Comedy Central 
television broadcast May 9, 2011), available at http://www.colbertnation.com/the-
colbert-report-videos/385702/may-09-2011/the-word---autocratic-for-the-people. 
 23. The Rachel Maddow Show: “Tyrants” Replacing Local Democracy in Michi-
gan (MSNBC television broadcast Dec. 8, 2011), available at http://video.msnbc.msn. 
com/the-rachel-maddow-show/45607138#45607138. 
 24. For an overview of each of these approaches as well as an analysis of their 
costs and benefits, see Omer Kimhi, Reviving Cities: Legal Remedies to Municipal 
Financial Crises, 88 B.U. L. REV. 633 (2008) [hereinafter Kimhi, Reviving Cities].  
Local finance law for cities in crisis is one of the most important, understudied topics 
in local government law.  In addition to Kimhi’s valuable contribution and other 
works cited herein, a few key resources on the subject include, inter alia: Heather M. 
Forrest, State Court Receivership Alternative to Chapter 9, 29 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 8, 
12, 81 (2010); Clayton P. Gillette, Bondholders and Financially Stressed Municipali-
ties, 39 FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 639 (2012) [hereinafter Gillette, Bondholders]; Clay-
ton P. Gillette, Fiscal Federalism, Political Will, and the Strategic Use of Municipal 
Bankruptcy, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 283 (2012) [hereinafter Gillette, Fiscal Federalism]; 
Michael W. McConnell & Randal C. Picker, When Cities Go Broke, A Conceptual 
Introduction to Municipal Bankruptcy, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 425 (1993). 
 25. See Kimhi, Reviving Cities, supra note 24, at 674–75. 
 26. See David R. Berman, Takeovers of Local Governments: An Overview and 
Evaluation of State Policies, 25 PUBLIUS J. FEDERALISM 55, 57 (1995). 
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pression.27  Dozens of cities, both large and small, have come under 
state supervision since the 1970s.28  The nature of this supervision has 
substantially varied along at least four dimensions: the existence of 
proactive state monitoring and audit programs; the trigger conditions 
and timing for intervention; the procedures, management, and leader-
ship of the state intervention; and the circumstances and terms of the 
state’s withdrawal.29 
Municipal insolvency legislation generally establishes triggering 
conditions for intervention, such as specific economic criteria.  It em-
powers a state financial board or state-appointed receiver to gather 
information about the city’s financial condition, to manage its debt 
(usually by providing guarantees to creditors for the city’s loans, 
thereby enabling the city to access credit markets), and to manage the 
city’s finances through approval of a rehabilitation plan with revenue 
and spending changes.30  State interventions have ranged from “over-
sight” systems with weak intervention authority to “control” systems 
with strong intervention authority.31  Central to the differences among 
these approaches is the status of local officials during the period of in-
tervention, as well as the power of the receiver to raise taxes and user 
fees, reduce expenditures, eliminate services, issue new service con-
tracts, liquidate municipal assets, and engage in negotiations over col-
lective bargaining agreements.32 
Receivership laws reflect differing theories about why local gov-
ernments fail.  Some theories emphasize internal causes, such as the 
 
 27. For a brief overview of the history and landscape of state interventions, see id. 
at 57–64.  Intervention policies generally come in two forms: special legislation tar-
geting a specific city in distress, or comprehensive legislation to govern monitoring 
and fiscal intervention across the state. Id. at 57. 
 28. Id. at 56 (estimating that at least fifty municipalities came under state control 
between the mid-1970s and the mid-1990s); see also Charles K. Coe, Preventing Lo-
cal Government Fiscal Crises: Emerging Best Practices, 68 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 759, 
759 (2008) (citing 2003 research identifying twenty-six states that “reported that one 
or more local governments had recently experienced a fiscal crisis”). 
 29. See Berman, supra note 26, at 68; Coe, supra note 28, at 760. See generally 
Kimhi, Reviving Cities, supra note 24; Note, Missed Opportunity: Urban Fiscal Cri-
ses and Financial Control Boards, 110 HARV. L. REV. 733 (1997). 
 30. Kimhi, Reviving Cities, supra note 24, at 654–55. 
 31. In his analysis of Pennsylvania’s intervention law, Berman offers a useful con-
trast between “oversight” arrangements that preserve local discretion in city opera-
tions and “control” arrangements in which the state “dictates specific policy steps.”  
Berman, supra note 26, at 61.  Coe’s analysis of best practices in the context of local 
fiscal crisis prevention and management analyzes the states with prevention laws in 
terms of the strength of their “intervention authority,” from strong to weak to no 
such power. Coe, supra note 28, at 760, 763–64. 
 32. See Coe, supra note 28, at 763–64. 
ANDERSON_CHRISTENSEN 7/11/2012  8:19 AM 
2012] DEMOCRATIC DISSOLUTION 585 
incompetence and untrustworthiness of municipal officials, or defects 
in the local political economy, particularly the dominance of a narrow 
band of special interests in local politics.33  Other explanations stress 
external factors, such as socioeconomic decline, regional change, and 
racial discrimination.34   
If causal theories vary, so too do the legislative purposes of state in-
tervention.  Receiverships can serve any or all of four constituencies 
and their interests.  First is the people of the city, who depend on the 
faltering local government to ensure public safety, provide services, 
protect property values, and the like.  Second is other municipalities 
in the state, which may suffer a contagion effect of the local crisis if 
municipal bond markets deem all cities in the state to be a less secure 
investment because the state allowed one of its cities to default on 
debt obligations.35 The third main constituency of municipal insolven-
cy laws is bondholders or creditors, who have a strong interest in 
avoiding the restructuring of debt permitted in municipal bankruptcy.  
Lastly, receiverships affect local public employees and retirees, who 
depend on and have relied upon contracts with the local government 
for their household financial security.  Like bondholders, these cur-
rent and former employees have a vested interest in avoiding bank-
ruptcy and its potential rupture of collective bargaining agreements.  
A state legislature’s theory of the causes of fiscal distress and its pur-
poses for intervention shape its legal intervention to ameliorate the 
crisis. 
Traditionally, state receiverships were coupled with increased fi-
nancial support from the state.36  It is a familiar carrot and stick for-
mula—bailout funds or loans tied to mandatory reform.  Given the 
current degree of state fiscal stress and falling levels of state aid for 
local governments, however, states are loathe to send bailout funding 
to even the most troubled local governments.37  States are thus look-
 
 33. Kimhi, Reviving Cities, supra note 24, at 642–46. 
 34. Id. 
 35. See Gillette, Fiscal Federalism, supra note 24, at 302 (defining contagion risks 
as “the possibility that local distress is indicative of more general fiscal difficulties or 
that unresolved local distress will cause disruption in other markets, because the risks 
of one are interconnected with risks elsewhere”). 
 36. See generally Berman, supra note 26.   
 37. While states saw stronger than expected growth in revenues in 2011, forty-two 
states and the District of Columbia have closed, or need to close, $103 billion in 
budget gaps, and because these gaps come after multiple years of using up state re-
serves, budget cuts are likely to be even more severe in 2012. Elizabeth McNichol, 
Phil Oliff & Nicholas Johnson, States Continue to Feel Recession’s Impact, CTR. ON 
BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES (Jan. 9, 2012), http://www.cbpp.org/files/2-8-08sfp.pdf. 
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ing for cheaper solutions to local problems—i.e., reforms that address 
local fiscal stress and its potential contagion impacts on the creditwor-
thiness of other municipalities in the state without providing state fi-
nancial support, whether offered as grants, loans, or loan guarantees.  
Michigan and Rhode Island are thus conducting an experiment of 
great interest to states with troubled municipalities.  Can a state slash 
funding for local governments while using an unprecedentedly strong 
state receivership as a backstop to fiscal distress? 
B. Michigan 
In February of 2011, the emergency manager for the Detroit Public 
Schools announced a desperate plan to cut costs:  He would close half 
of the district schools, thereby increasing class sizes to as many as six-
ty students.38  The City of Detroit was faring little better, as it and 
other Michigan cities headed toward the shoals of municipal bank-
ruptcy.39  In March of that year, Governor Rick Snyder and the state 
legislature responded with a bill strengthening the “Local Govern-
ment and School District Fiscal Accountability Act.”40  The amend-
 
Budgetary shortfalls in 2012 may reach $112 billion dollars, or nearly 19% of all state 
spending commitments, due to the combined effects of declining tax revenues and 
increased demand for services. Robert Pollin & Jeffrey Thompson, Fighting Austeri-
ty and Reclaiming a Future for State and Local Governments (Political Econ. Re-
search Inst., Working Paper No. 259, 2011), available at http://www.peri.umass.edu/ 
fileadmin/pdf/working_papers/working_papers_251-300/WP259.pdf.  Proposals for 
budget cuts often include funding cuts for local governments, and indeed, in 2011 
more than twenty states cut funding to local governments. James C. Cooper, The 
New Fiscal Nightmare: 2012 State Budget Cuts, FISCAL TIMES (May 31, 2011), http:// 
www.thefiscaltimes.com/Columns/2011/05/31/The-New-Fiscal-Nightmare-2012-State-
Budgets-Cuts.aspx#page1 (citing data from the National Association of Governors 
and National Association of State Budget Officers). 
 38. See Ben Rooney, Michigan Approves Plan to Close Half of Detroit Schools, 
CNN MONEY (Feb. 22, 2011), http://money.cnn.com/2011/02/22/news/economy/det 
roit_school_restructuring/index.htm.  Though the state approved such reforms, they 
did not ultimately go into effect. See Darrell Dawsey, Detroit Won’t Raise Class Siz-
es to 60 Students, but Is Five Years Enough Time to Eliminate Deficit?, DETROIT 
FREE PRESS (Feb. 25, 2011), http://www.mlive.com/news/detroit/index.ssf/2011/02/dps 
_deficit-elimination_plan_w.html. 
 39. See, e.g., Jeff Green & Jonathan Keehner, Muni Bankruptcy Threat Makes 
Michigan Train Financial-Emergency SWAT Teams, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Apr. 17, 
2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-04-18/muni-bankruptcy-threat-makes-
michigan-train-financial-emergency-swat-teams.html. 
 40. Local Government and School District Fiscal Accountability Act, 2011 Mich. 
Legis. Serv. 4 (West) (codified as amended at MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 141.1501–1531 
(2011)).  The present analysis is limited to the provisions of the Act applicable to 
general purpose local governments.  Its school district implications, however, are of 
great interest.  For analysis of state takeovers of fiscally distressed school districts and 
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ments mark the third-generation legislative effort in the state to per-
mit direct state intervention in local finance, but to a new degree, the 
recent reforms embody the statutory title’s emphasis on “fiscal ac-
countability”—if not punishment or blameworthiness—rather than 
local need.41 The amendments significantly and controversially ampli-
fied the power given to emergency managers, and they permitted 
state intervention at earlier stages of financial deterioration and in a 
wider range of circumstances.42  
The first key change in the law is to empower emergency managers 
to replace all officials elected to govern the city.  The law provides 
that emergency managers will “act for and in the place and stead of 
the governing body and the office of chief administrative officer,” fur-
ther specifying that throughout the “pendency of receivership, the 
governing body and the chief administrative officer of the local gov-
ernment may not exercise any of the powers of those offices except as 
may be specifically authorized in writing by the emergency manager 
and are subject to any conditions required by the emergency manag-
er.”43  It allows the receiver to literally lock local officials out of city 
offices, email accounts, and internal information systems, if needed to 
minimize disruption of “the emergency manager’s ability to manage 
the government.” 44 
Under the new law, emergency managers issue a “financial and op-
erating plan,” which must be presented to the public in an informa-
tional hearing, though no public approval is sought.45  The plan must 
provide for payment in full of debt service on “bonds, notes, and mu-
 
other measures to restore fiscal solvency, see Kristi L. Bowman, Before School Dis-
tricts Go Broke: A Proposal for Federal Reform, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 895, 925–30 
(2011) (noting that seventeen states authorize a state or mayoral takeover of a local 
school district for fiscal, as opposed to academic, reasons, and fifty-six such takeovers 
were either primarily triggered by fiscal distress or were triggered by a combination 
of academic, management, and fiscal problems).  Bowman’s article, unfortunately, 
went to press prior to the enactment of the Michigan reforms. 
 41. Compare id., with Local Government Fiscal Accountability Act of 1990, 
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 141.1201–1291 (West 1990) (repealed 2011). 
 42. See J. HUNAULT ET. AL., HOUSE FISCAL AGENCY, LEGISLATIVE ANALYSIS: 
LOCAL GOVERNMENT & SCHOOL DISTRICT FISCAL ACCOUNTABILITY ACT 1 (2011), 
available at http://www.legislature.mi.gov/documents/2011-2012/billanalysis/House/ 
pdf/2011-HLA-4214-6.pdf; Citizens Research Council of Mich., The Local Govern-
ment and School District Fiscal Accountability Act: Public Act 4 of 2011 at 10–11 
(Apr. 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.crcmich.org/PUBLI 
CAT/2010s/2011/rpt368.pdf. 
 43. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 141.1515(4). 
 44. Id. § 141.1517(2). 
 45. Id. § 141.1518(1), (4). 
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nicipal securities . . . and all other uncontested legal obligations,”46 
but it permits emergency managers to reject, modify, or terminate 
service, purchase, or other non-labor contracts.47  With respect to la-
bor contracts, the emergency manager can “reject, modify or termi-
nate” terms of an existing collective bargaining agreement after he 
determines—in his sole discretion—that a satisfactory, consensual 
modification of the agreement “is unlikely to be obtained” and that a 
list of statutory conditions have occurred.48  The emergency manager 
can suspend collective bargaining for a period of up to five years, and 
he may assume the role of trustee of any pension funds that are not at 
least 80% actuarially funded.49 
Emergency managers also have the power to consolidate or elimi-
nate local departments and set aside minimum staffing requirements 
provided in the city charter or contracts.50  At the most dramatic level 
of restructuring, the emergency manager may, upon approval by the 
governor, dissolve the local government unit itself without first satis-
fying the provisions of Michigan’s dissolution law or seeking approval 
through the state boundary change agency.51  He may alternately rec-
ommend to the state boundary commission that the local government 
consolidate with one or more other municipal governments.  The 
emergency manager, however, must first determine that such consoli-
dation “would materially alleviate the financial emergency of the mu-
nicipal government and would not materially and adversely affect the 
financial situation of the government or governments with which the 
municipal government in receivership is consolidated.”52  This second 
requirement makes consolidations of a poor municipality with a 
neighboring wealthy one (like Benton Harbor with St. Joseph) ex-
tremely improbable.  Indeed, it is hard to imagine a situation in which 
the second criteria could be met without a major state aid package ac-
companying a consolidation. 
Prior to passage of the 2010 amendments to the Act, emergency 
managers were already in place in the Detroit Public School Dis-
 
 46. Id. § 141.1518(1)(b). 
 47. Id. §§ 141.1518 (1)(c), 1519(1)(j). 
 48. Id. § 141.1519(k).  
 49. Id. § 141.1519(m).  
 50. Id. § 141.1519(i). 
 51. Id. § 141.1519(cc) (establishing a mode of dissolution requiring approval by 
the emergency manager and governor alone, but preserving existing state laws re-
garding the assignment of assets, debts, and liabilities following dissolution); cf. id. § 
141.1519(bb) (providing that any consolidation “shall proceed as provided by law”). 
 52. Id. § 141.1519(bb). 
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trict,53 as well as in the cities of Pontiac, Benton Harbor, and Ecorse.54  
Upon passage of the reforms, those appointees received augmented 
authority.  Flint, the Highland Park School District, and the Mus-
kegon Heights School District were soon designated for state inter-
vention.55  The City of Detroit was widely reported as next in line, but 
a wave of protests led the governor’s administration to consider pub-
licly a consent-based alternative in which the city’s democratically 
elected officials would carry out a state-mandated package of fiscal 
reforms.56  Press reports indicate that state officials have a list of more 
than two dozen additional local governments and school districts also 
under consideration for intervention.57 
With the stakes of state intervention set so much higher, however, 
the potential of an emergency manager takeover may have already 
affected local politics in struggling cities.  For instance, one local col-
umnist opined that the new law gives Detroit’s Mayor Bing a new 
source of leverage: “the power to strike fear into the heart of unions 
and [the] City Council by quietly threatening to use that law.”58  
Mayor Bing himself, the article reasoned, could seek appointment to 
become the city’s emergency manager.59  Under the new law, such a 
move could occur, but only at the governor’s discretion—Bing would 
need to convince the governor that it was simply his lack of authority 
 
 53. See Karen Bouffard, House OKs Tougher Approach to Faltering Cities, 
Schools, DETROIT NEWS, Feb. 24, 2011, at A1. 
 54. Tim Martin, Lawsuit Targets Michigan Emergency Manager Law, LEGAL 
NEWS (June 24, 2011), http://www.legalnews.com/Oakland/989099. 
 55. Karen Pierog, Michigan Governor OKs Takeover of Flint, REUTERS (Nov. 29, 
2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/11/29/us-flint-michigan-emergency-idUST 
RE7AS2MY20111129; Snyder Names Emergency Manager For Muskegon Heights 
Schools, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Apr. 20, 2012, at A7. 
 56. John D. Stoll, Michigan Governor Prefers No Detroit Emergency Manager, 
REUTERS (Jan. 23, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/23/us-michgov-
detroit-idUSTRE80M2AO20120123.  
 57. See Jennifer Chambers, Governor Targets 18 Area Districts, DETROIT NEWS, 
Apr. 28, 2011, at A3 (noting that of the twenty-three fiscally distressed school dis-
tricts identified by the governor, eighteen are in Metro Detroit); Eric Gaertner, Mus-
kegon Heights’ Deficit Dilemma—Financial Emergency Law Casts Shadow, GRAND 
RAPIDS PRESS, Apr. 4, 2011, at A10. 
 58. Laura Berman, Super Powers Intrigue Bing, DETROIT NEWS, Apr. 21, 2011, at 
A1. 
 59. Id.; see also Charles Sercombe, Councilmember Is Ready to Act as EFM if 
Needed, HAMTRAMCK REV. (Oct. 25, 2011), http://www.hamtramckreview.com/2011/ 
04/councilmember-is-ready-to-act-as-efm-if-needed (reporting that a member of the 
city council of the distressed city of Hamtramck had received training to act as an  
emergency manager). 
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with the City Council, labor unions, contractors, or all of the above 
that stood between him and the city’s fiscal recovery. 
The impact of the law has disproportionately impacted the state’s 
African-American population.  The four cities already approved for 
intervention have proportionately large African-American popula-
tions: Benton Harbor is 91.4% African-American,60 Flint is 59.5%,61 
Pontiac is 55.3%,62 and Ecorse is 48.6%.63  The press has widely and 
accurately reported that close to half of the state’s African-American 
population will be governed by an emergency manager if Detroit is 
approved for state intervention, as threatened.64  Indeed, that number 
climbs to 57% if one assesses the share of the African-American pop-
ulation currently governed by an emergency manager either in their 
city or in their school district.65  Each of the cities selected for an 
emergency manager has a Latino population as well, such that the 
non-Hispanic white populations of the cities range from a meager 
 
 60. Benton Harbor General Profile Census, supra note 7. 
 61. Flint, Michigan—Profile of General Population and Housing Characteristics: 
2010, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU [hereinafter Flint General Profile Census], http://factfin 
der2.census.gov/faces/nav/jsf/pages/index.xhtml (Quick Start search: topic “DP-1” for 
“Flint city, Michigan”; then follow “2010 Demographic Profile SF” hyperlink).  
 62. Pontiac, Michigan—Profile of General Population and Housing Characteris-
tics: 2010, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU [hereinafter Pontiac General Profile Census], http:// 
factfinder2.census.gov/faces/nav/jsf/pages/index.xhtml (Quick Start search: topic 
“DP-1” for “Pontiac city, Michigan”; then follow “2010 Demographic Profile SF” hy-
perlink). 
 63. Ecorse, Michigan—Profile of General Population and Housing Characteris-
tics: 2010, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU [hereinafter Ecorse General Profile Census], http:// 
factfinder2.census.gov/faces/nav/jsf/pages/index.xhtml (Quick Start search: topic 
“DP-1” for “Ecorse city, Michigan”; then follow “2010 Demographic Profile SF” hy-
perlink).  
 64. See Benton Harbor General Profile Census, supra note 7; Ecorse General 
Profile Census, supra note 63; Flint General Profile Census, supra note 61; Pontiac 
General Profile Census, supra note 62; Detroit—Demographic and Housing Charac-
teristics: 2006–2010, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://factfinder2.census.gov/faces/nav/jsf/ 
pages/index.xhtml (Quick Start search: topic “DP05” for “Detroit”; then follow “2010 
ACS 5-year estimates” hyperlink); Michigan—Demographic and Housing Character-
istics: 2006–2010, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://factfinder2.census.gov/faces/nav/jsf/pa 
ges/index.xhtml (Quick Start search: topic “DP05” for “Michigan”; then follow “2010 
ACS 5-year estimates” hyperlink); see also  Rachel Maddow: Mich Emergency Man-
ager Story “the Most Important & Undercovered Story of the Year,” DAILY KOS 
(Dec. 9, 2011, 5:10 AM), http://www.dailykos.com/story/2011/12/09/1043610/-Rachel-
Maddow-Mich-Emergency-Manager-story-the-most-important-undercovered-story-
of-the-year (reporting statistics). 
 65. Compare supra note 64, with Michigan School District Demographic Profiles, 
PROXIMITY, http://proximityone.com/mi_sdc.htm (Quick Start search: topic “DP1” 
for “Detroit City School District,” “Highland Park City Schools,” and “Muskegon 
Heights School District”). 
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6.4% (in Benton Harbor) to a modest high of 36.5% (in Ecorse).66  
The cities selected for intervention are also very high poverty, with 
poverty rates ranging from a low of 32% in Pontiac to a high of 48.7% 
in Benton Harbor (compared to a 13.8% national average).67  Oppo-
sition to the law thus emphasizes that the displacement of elected lo-
cal governments by emergency managers is taking place in poor and 
minority cities.   
Advocacy groups are fighting for a repeal of the law, claiming that 
the new authority granted to emergency managers “empowers an un-
accountable and unelected czar to nullify worker contracts and sell off 
assets.”68  Proponents of the repeal collected and submitted the requi-
site number of signatures to call a November 2012 referendum, 
though a legal challenge to the font size used on the petitions is wend-
ing up the ladder of appeals.69  Possible appointment of an emergency 
manager in Detroit has created a particular storm of controversy, in-
cluding a number of major protests.70  An op-ed by David Alexander 
Bullock, the president of the Highland Park, Michigan chapter of the 
NAACP, argued that an illusory hero myth underlies the emergency 
manager law: 
 
 66. See id.; Benton Harbor General Profile Census, supra note 7; Flint General 
Profile Census, supra note 61; Pontiac General Profile Census, supra note 62. 
 67. See Benton Harbor Economics Census, supra note 4; Ecorse, Michigan—
Selected Economic Characteristics: 2006–2010, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://factfin 
der2.census.gov/faces/nav/jsf/pages/index.xhtml (Quick Start search: topic “DP03” for 
“Ecorse city, Michigan”; then follow “2010 ACS 5-year estimates” hyperlink); Flint, 
Michigan—Selected Economic Characteristics: 2006–2010, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
http://factfinder2.census.gov/faces/nav/jsf/pages/index.xhtml (Quick Start search: top-
ic “DP03” for “Flint city, Michigan”; then follow “2010 ACS 5-year estimates” hyper-
link); United States—Selected Economic Characteristics: 2006–2010, U.S. CENSUS, 
http://factfinder2.census.gov/faces/nav/jsf/pages/index.xhtml (Quick Start search: top-
ic “DP03” for “United States”; then follow “2010 ACS 5-year estimates” hyperlink). 
 68. RAINBOW PUSH COALITION, supra note 4; see also Ungar, supra note 4 (call-
ing Snyder’s law a “shocking, Draconian, democracy-destroying measure[]”). 
 69. See Chad Livengood, Appeals Panel Throws More Uncertainty on EM Law 
Repeal, DETROIT FREE PRESS, June 9, 2012, at A1; Jonathan Oosting, Coalition 
Seeks Action on Emergency Manager Referendum in Wake of Appeals Court Victo-
ry, MLIVE.COM (June 21, 2012), http://www.mlive.com/news/detroit/index.ssf/2012/06/ 
coalition_seeks_action_on_emer.html.  It is not clear what the outcome of a success-
ful repeal vote might be. Marcus Wright, EM Opponents Closer to Goal, MICH. CITI-
ZEN (Sept. 11, 2011), http://michigancitizen.com/em-opponents-closer-to-goal-p10221 
-1.htm.  Because the 2011 Bill repealed the 1990 Act that created the statutory au-
thority for emergency managers, the repeal of the 2011 Act may result in a return to 
the 1990 law or result in both laws being suspended. Id. 
 70. See, e.g., Kathleen Gray & Steve Neavling, Protesters at Snyder’s Subdivision 
Divided, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Jan. 17, 2012, at A3 (covering the January 16, 2012 
protest outside the gated community where Governor Snyder lives). 
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The emergency manager is supposed to be a hero.  After receiving 
training by the Snyder administration, s/he will come in and do what 
no elected official and collective community action can—save De-
troit.  This is a destructive fiction.  The Detroit Public School sys-
tem, the City of Highland Park and the City of Benton Harbor 
prove that emergency managers are not miracle workers or super-
natural saviors.  Detroit doesn’t need an emergency manager.  De-
troit needs emergency reconstruction.  We don’t need a consultant.  
We need community and civic engagement.  It will take elected offi-
cials, labor, pastors, parents and citizens at large to turn this ship 
around before it collides into the impending iceberg of increasing 
decline.71 
In addition, several legal challenges have been filed.  The main 
case, which Governor Snyder called the Michigan Supreme Court to 
take up on an expedited basis,72 challenges the emergency manager 
law as a violation of several state constitutional provisions, including 
its contracts clause, its home rule laws, and its ban on unfunded man-
dates.73  The lawsuit alleges that the law “usurps the constitutionally 
mandated rights of local electors to a republican form of government 
and to choose the officials of local government by democratic elec-
tions.”74  The challenge was brought by private plaintiffs with counsel 
from the Sugar Law Center for Economic and Social Justice in De-
troit, the Center for Constitutional Rights in New York, the Detroit 
and Michigan National Lawyers Guild, and private firms.75  A sepa-
rate action, which challenged the pension provisions of the Act on 
federal and state constitutional grounds, was recently dismissed as un-
ripe, because the Act had not yet impacted Detroit’s pension funds.76 
 
 71. David Alexander Bullock, Emergency Managers Destroy Democracy, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 27, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-alexander-
bullock/detroit-emergency-managers-democracy_b_1237031.html. 
 72. Executive Message from Rick Snyder, Governor, Mich., to Chief Justice, 
Mich. Supreme Court (Aug. 12, 2011), available at http://www.sugarlaw.org/wp-con 
tent/uploads/2011/08/Executive-Message-Aug-2011-Re-Brown-v-Snyder.pdf.  This 
expedite request remains pending with the Court. See In re Exec. Message of the 
Governor, 807 N.W.2d 302 (Mich. 2012), docket tracking available at Michigan Court 
of Appeals Docket Number Inquiry: 143563, http://coa.courts.mi.gov/resources/asp/ 
viewdocket.asp?casenumber=143563&inqtype=sdoc&yr=0&yr=0&SubmitBtn=Searc
h (last visited June 13, 2012). 
 73. Complaint at ¶¶ 67–68, 73, 78, 83, 90, Brown v. Snyder, No. 11-685-CZ (Mich. 
Ct. Cl. June 22, 2011), available at http://op.bna.com/dlrcases.nsf/r?Open=edue-8j4 
qjt. 
 74. Id. at ¶ 59. 
 75. Id. at ¶¶ 1–2. 
 76. Gen. Ret. Sys. of Detroit v. Snyder, No. 11-11866, 2011 WL 4506357 (E.D. 
Mich. Sept. 29, 2011). 
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C. Rhode Island 
Across the country, Michigan has a counterpart in state receiver-
ship reform.  In 2010, Rhode Island significantly ratcheted up the 
power of state oversight and intervention in local government finance 
by amending the state’s “Act Relating to Cities and Towns—
Providing Financial Stability.”77  The earlier generation of the Act, 
promulgated in 1993, had empowered the state’s director of admin-
istration to establish a budget commission for municipalities that sat-
isfied specific triggering conditions, namely that the city’s bond rating 
had fallen below investment grade and “there [was] an imminent 
threat of default on any or all of its debt obligations.”78  These budget 
commissions were composed of both state and local appointees (in-
cluding the city council president, city residents, and ex-officio state 
officers), but they gave local stakeholders a two-thirds majority and 
required only a simple majority for action.79  The weight of local in-
terests on the board was a key tenet of the reasoning in a Rhode Is-
land Supreme Court decision in 1994 finding that the law was consti-
tutional, because the impact on local home rule authority and 
municipal structure was “at most incidental and temporary.”80 
In 2010, with some notable amendments in 2011,81 the state Gen-
eral Assembly enacted a new, stronger version of the law.82  The new 
regime establishes three stages of intervention: (1) the appointment 
of a fiscal overseer to examine the city’s budget and make recom-
mendations to local officials; (2) the appointment of a budget com-
mission; and (3) the appointment of a state receiver.83  The second 
 
 77. Compare R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 45-9-3 (West 2011), with Act Relating to 
Budget and Review Commission, 1993 R.I. Pub. Laws 242.   
 78. 1993 R.I. Pub. Laws 242. 
 79. Specifically, the commissions were composed of four state officers or their ap-
pointees, two officers of the city, and three residents of the city to be selected by the 
Governor from a list generated by the House and Senate. Id. (identifying the mem-
bers of a budget commission). 
 80. See Marran v. Baird, 635 A.2d 1174, 1178 (R.I. 1994); Katherine Newby 
Kishfy, Note, Preserving Local Autonomy in the Face of Municipal Financial Crisis: 
Reconciling Rhode Island’s Response to the Central Falls Financial Crisis with the 
State’s Home Rule Tradition, 16 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 348, 376–78 (2011). 
 81. As this Article went to press in June, 2012, members of Rhode Island’s House 
and Senate had introduced legislation to further amend the receivership law.  See 
H.B. 7353, 2012 Leg. Sess. (R.I. Feb. 2, 2012) (Westlaw); S.B. 2280, 2012 Leg. Sess. 
(R.I. Feb. 1, 2012) (Westlaw); H.B. 5604, 2011 Leg. Sess. (R.I. March 3, 2011) 
(Westlaw).  Those proposed reforms are discussed infra in Part II-C. 
 82. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 45-9-1.  
 83. See id. §§ 45-9-3 to -17; Kishfy, supra note 80, at 379–82 (analyzing the 2010 
bill in detail, and in comparison to the 1993 law). 
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stage budget commission is considerably more powerful than that 
provided for under the 1993 version of the Act, as it is dominated by a 
majority of state appointees and stakeholders and eliminates the seats 
for members of the local electorate.84 
The most controversial changes to the law, however, lie in the pro-
cess and powers associated with the strongest medicine, the state re-
ceiver.85  The Act grants the receiver the “powers of the city or town 
council exercisable by resolution or ordinance,”86 as well as the “pow-
er to exercise any function or power of any municipal officer or em-
ployee, board, authority or commission, whether elected or otherwise 
relating to or impacting the fiscal stability of the city or town includ-
ing, without limitation, school and zoning matters.”87  Elected officials 
are demoted to an “advisory” role, with the receiver enjoying deci-
sion-making authority in the face of conflict.88  To make the hierarchy 
of authority even more indisputable, the Act further provides that 
“elected officials or [anybody of the city or town] shall not rescind or 
take any action contrary to such action by the receiver so long as the 
receivership continues to exist.”89 
Critically, the Rhode Island law empowers emergency managers to 
negotiate and approve any future collective bargaining agreements 
signed by the city during the emergency manager’s term, and it re-
quires them to provide certification to the state’s department of reve-
nue that the city can afford the agreement “without a detrimental im-
pact on the provision of municipal services.”90  In contrast to the 
Michigan bill, however, the Act expressly denies the receiver any au-
thority “to reject or alter any existing collective bargaining agree-
ment, unless by agreement, during the term of [the agreement].”91 
 
 84. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 45-9-6(a) (calling for a five-member budget commis-
sion with three appointees from the director of revenue, and one each from the elect-
ed chief executive officer of the city and the president of the city or town council). 
 85. For ease, I will refer to state receivers in Michigan and Rhode Island as both 
“emergency managers” and “state receivers,” though technically Michigan uses the 
former language and Rhode Island uses the latter. 
 86. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 45-9-20. 
 87. Id. § 45-9-7(b)(2). 
 88. Id. § 45-9-7(c) (“[T]he powers of the receiver shall be superior to and super-
sede the powers of the elected officials of the city or town [who] shall continue to be 
elected in accordance with the city or town charter, and shall serve in an advisory ca-
pacity to the receiver. . . . In the event a conflict arises between the chief elected offi-
cial or city or town council and the receiver, the receiver’s decision shall prevail.”). 
 89. Id. § 45-9-18. 
 90. Id. § 45-9-9. 
 91. Id. 
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As compared with earlier versions of the law, the 2010 reforms 
loosen the triggering conditions for state intervention, making them 
much less objective.  The state’s director of revenue is empowered to 
establish a budget commission upon a determination by a financial 
overseer that the city or town meets any of four general criteria, in-
cluding the inability “to present a balanced municipal budget” or a 
determination by the overseer that the city “[w]ill not achieve fiscal 
stability without the assistance of a budget commission.”92  To move 
from a budget commission to a receiver, the commission must simply 
“conclude[] that its powers are insufficient to restore fiscal stability” 
and state its reasons for that conclusion.93  The Act also provides for 
immediate appointment of a receiver without first designating an 
overseer or budget commission in cases where “a city or town is fac-
ing a fiscal emergency and . . . circumstances do not allow for ap-
pointment of a fiscal overseer or a budget commission prior to the 
appointment of a receiver.”94  Fiscal emergency is not defined in the 
statute.95 
A few remaining features of the law are worth noting.  The law 
provides that the state director of revenue has authority to determine 
the receiver’s salary, but that such salary will be paid by the city.96  In 
addition, provisions added in 2011 expressly indemnify the state’s di-
rector of revenue or any fiscal overseer, budget commission member, 
receiver, or staff thereto of any legal liability for wrongs including the 
“neglect or violation of the rights of any person under any federal or 
state law . . . except in the case of intentional malfeasance, malicious 
conduct or gross negligence.”97  A costs provision grants attorney’s 
fees to a state intervener in the case of any non-prevailing party who 
has ignored a written demand made by that intervener.98 
The 2010 legal reforms in Rhode Island were a reaction to a decla-
ration of fiscal insolvency and a petition for judicial receivership by 
the City of Central Falls in May of that year.99  Bond rating agencies 
 
 92. Id. § 45-9-5. 
 93. Id. § 45-9-7(a). 
 94. Id. § 45-9-8. 
 95. See id. §§ 45-9-2, -7; see also Moreau v. Flanders, 15 A.3d 565, 583–84 (R.I. 
2011) (confirming the absence of a definition of “fiscal emergency,” but finding that 
omission to fall short of unconstitutional vagueness). 
 96. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 45-9-7(c). 
 97. Id. § 45-9-22. 
 98. Id. § 45-9-23. 
 99. Central Falls’ economy declined over several decades beginning in the 1970s 
when textile manufacturers began moving overseas—taking nearly 1400 jobs with 
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downgraded the city’s debt to junk bond status.100  Fearful of conta-
gion effects on the creditworthiness of other Rhode Island municipal-
ities, the governor and General Assembly acted within one month to 
pass the 2010 receivership law, which covered Central Falls retroac-
tively.101 
In a letter issued three days after his appointment, the city’s first 
receiver wrote to the city’s elected mayor: “Effective immediately, I 
have assumed the duties and functions of the Office of Mayor.  As a 
result of my role, your responsibility will be limited to serving in an 
advisory capacity, on such occasions as my office may seek input from 
you.”102  The letter also announced a reduction in the mayor’s salary 
to $26,000 per year.103  Shortly thereafter, the receiver rescinded reso-
lutions and canceled meetings of the City Council that were intended 
to engage legal counsel on the challenges facing the city and to ex-
press policy views on positions taken by the receiver.104  As a conse-
quence of these resolutions and meetings scheduled without the re-
ceiver’s permission, in November 2010, he exercised his authority un-
under the Act to, in his words, “relegate the City Council and its 
members to an advisory capacity.  I will let you know if and when the 
advice of the City Council and/or its members is needed.”105  Accord-
ing to comments made by the city’s elected officials to The New York 
Times, the receiver at no time sought their input or advice.106 
For approximately two years, two sequential state receivers have 
constituted the sole government of Central Falls.  They have raised 
taxes, renegotiated union contracts, closed the library and community 
center, and laid off city employees.107  Nonetheless, on August 1, 2011 
 
them. Alan Farnham, 3 Most Desperate Cities Include Vallejo, Calif., Harrisburg, 
Pa., Central Falls, R.I., ABC NEWS (Sept. 8, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/Business/ 
desperate-us-cities-counties-file-bankruptcy/story?id=14464314.  The state budget 
cuts following the 2008 recession hit Central Falls particularly hard because of its 
stagnant tax base and state limits on property tax increases, as well as dependency on 
state aid dating back to a school receivership implemented by the state in 1991. John 
Hill, For City, Decades of Missed Chances; Central Falls, PROVIDENCE J., Sept. 11, 
2011, at A1. 
 100. Goodnough, supra note 1. 
 101. Nick Brown, Analysis: Rhode Island Law May Transform Local Bankrupt-
cies, REUTERS (Aug. 11, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/11/us-bankru 
ptcy-rhodeisland-idUSTRE77A2PK20110811. 
 102. Moreau v. Flanders, 15 A.3d 565, 572 (R.I. 2011). 
 103. Goodnough, supra note 1. 
 104. Moreau, 15 A.3d at 572, 573 n.7. 
 105. Id. at 573 n.7. 
 106. Goodnough, supra note 1. 
 107. See Farnham, supra note 99. 
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the state-appointed receiver of Central Falls filed for municipal bank-
ruptcy.108  In December 2010, the receiver estimated that the city’s 
annual budget of $16 million was still facing annual deficits of $5 mil-
lion and retiree obligations of $80 million.109  The current receiver or-
dered reductions of up to 50% in pensions and suggested potential 
cuts to police and fire budgets of 40%.110  Estimates of the state’s le-
gal bills related to the Central Falls receivership between June 2010 
and August 2011—including approximately $350,000 in salary for the 
two receivers who served sequentially during that period—amount to 
approximately $1.4 million.111 
At the same time of the state receivership reforms, also in response 
to the Central Falls meltdown, the state legislature acted to stave off 
contagion effects on the bond ratings of other municipalities in the 
state by passing legislation that guaranteed municipal bondholders 
payment even in a case of municipal bankruptcy.112  Bondholders 
would receive liens on taxes and general revenues and would recover 
before other creditors.113  The law, which would change pre-existing 
contracts between vendors and municipalities, may suffer retroactivi-
ty and contracts clause defects that are currently under legal consid-
eration.114  That bill’s own shortcomings notwithstanding, it constitut-
ed a much more direct answer to contagion effect fears than the 
receivership legislation.115 
Whatever the wisdom of the enacted reforms, the state legislature 
has had good reason to worry about Rhode Island’s municipal bond 
 
 108. Mike “Mish” Shedlock, Central Falls Set to File Bankruptcy Exit Plan; 50% 
Pension Reductions, 40% Slash in Police and Fire Budgets Coming Up, MISH’S 
GLOBAL ECON. TREND ANALYSIS (Sept. 1, 2011, 7:35 PM), http://globaleconomicanal 
ysis.blogspot.com/2011/09/central-falls-set-to-file-bankruptcy.html.  
 109. Michael McDonald & David McLaughlin, ‘Dire’ Finances Force R.I. City into 
Bankruptcy, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Aug. 1, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/ 
2011-08-01/-dire-situation-forces-rhode-island-city-of-central-falls-into-
bankruptcy.html. 
 110. Shedlock, supra note 108. 
 111. John Hill, RI Legal Bills for Central Falls Crisis Around $1.4 Million, PROVI-
DENCE J. (Aug. 10, 2011), http://news.providencejournal.com/breaking-news/2011/08/ 
ris-legal-bills-for-cf-crisis.html. 
 112. Brown, supra note 101. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. See generally Gillette, Fiscal Federalism, supra note 24, at 306 (arguing that 
“rational investors in municipal obligations would expect centralized governments to 
bail out fiscally distressed localities when the adverse consequences of default due to 
contagion or fear of systemic risk exceed the centralized bailout costs”); see infra Part 
II.B (arguing that the state receivership reforms discussed in this Article provide 
blunt instruments for containment of contagion effects). 
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markets.  Several cities in the state are struggling financially and have 
entered the pipeline of state fiscal intervention. As noted, interven-
tion advances from a state-appointed fiscal overseer, to a budget 
commission, to the strongest assertion of state control: a receiver.  
The City of Woonsocket has a budget commission, and, as of this 
writing, appointment of a receiver appears imminent.116  East Provi-
dence has a fiscal overseer,117 and the cities of Providence, Pawtucket, 
and West Warwick are currently receiving informal assistance from 
the state that may soon bring them under the receivership law.118   
The slide into increasing levels of state control in these cities is re-
vealing the broader ideological politics at stake in receivership laws.  
Woonsocket’s state representatives in the General Assembly are ad-
vocating the appointment of a receiver, despite the budget cuts, credit 
risk, and stigma likely to result for Woonsocket’s residents and local 
government.119  As reported in The New York Times, one of those 
legislators, Jon Brien, sits on the national board of the American Leg-
islative Exchange Council, a conservative advocacy group focused on 
reducing the size of state budgets.120  Brien commented to the Times 
that the threat of a receiver was a good way to force the downsizing of 
the city government and the renegotiation of union contracts and 
pensions, because “you never move faster than when you have a pi-
ano hanging over your head . . . . The receiver is that piano.”121   
As in Michigan, the Rhode Island receivership law has generated 
heated public opposition.  The ACLU Foundation of Rhode Island 
deemed it an “[a]nti-[c]ivil [l]iberties [b]ill[]” and a “troubling anti-
democratic measure,” because it “gives the receiver virtually dicta-
 
 116. Erika Niedowski, 2nd RI City Facing Receivership After Tax Stalls, 
BUSINESSWEEK (June 13, 2012), http://www.businessweek.com/ap/2012-06-13/2nd-ri-
city-facing-receivership-after-tax-stalls. 
 117. Ted Nesi, Gov Taps Trooper to Oversee EP’s Budget: Officials Stress City is 
Not Central Falls, WPRI.COM (Nov. 14, 2011, updated Dec. 2, 2011), http://www.wpri 
.com/dpp/news/local_news/providence/ri-to-name-overseer-to-handle-ep-finances. 
 118. Ted Nesi, Woonsocket Under Direct State Oversight: Commission put in 
Charge of Woonsocket’s Finances, WPRI.COM (May 29, 2012, updated June 14, 
2012), http://www.wpri.com/dpp/news/local_news/blackstone/woonsocket-third-ri-city 
-under-direct-state-oversight. 
 119. Joe Nocera, When ALEC Takes Over Your Town, N.Y. TIMES (June 18, 
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/19/opinion/nocera-when-alec-takes-over-your 
-town.html. 
 120. Id.  
 121. Id. 
ANDERSON_CHRISTENSEN 7/11/2012  8:19 AM 
2012] DEMOCRATIC DISSOLUTION 599 
torial authority.”122  The mayor and city council of Central Falls chal-
lenged the constitutionality of the law under Rhode Island’s home 
rule guarantee against state laws that “affect the form of government 
of any city or town,”123 among other claims.124  The Rhode Island Su-
preme Court upheld the law in March 2011, finding that the receiver 
provisions did not affect the form or structure of government in Cen-
tral Falls.125  The court held that “although there has been a tempo-
rary impact on the form of government in this instance, because the 
director of the Department of Revenue and receiver have invoked 
their statutory powers, that impact is channeled, incidental, and tem-
porary.”126  The court acknowledged the receiver’s “broad and sweep-
ing” powers, but found that those powers were limited by ongoing 
state controls, such as the requirement that his work pursue the pur-
poses of the Act and the state’s potential to grant control to elected 
officials “depending on the circumstances.”127  Yet the case had chal-
lenged the receiver’s intrusion on local autonomy and the receiver’s 
displacement of the local government.  Whatever one thinks of the 
outcome of the case, the court’s reasoning that the law did not affect 
the form of government because of discretionary limits controlled at 
the state level was evasive and unsound; it was an act of deference to 
the state legislature with slim regard for local government constitu-
tional autonomy. 
II.  RECEIVERSHIPS AS DEMOCRATIC DISSOLUTION 
Municipal insolvency laws are important and necessary, offering 
important advantages over municipal bankruptcy and traditional 
creditor remedies.128 The budgetary deficits and debt currently bear-
ing down on both state and local governments is a world of no easy 
options.  Ongoing legislative experimentation in this area is thus im-
portant for local public policy, and the Rhode Island and Michigan 
laws each have commendable features.  For instance, both laws en-
gage the state earlier in proactive monitoring of local fiscal health, 
with stages of intervention that permit more modest involvement be-
 
 122. Rhode Island ACLU, Enacted Anti-Civil Liberties Bills, 2010 LEGISLATIVE 
WRAP-UP NEWSLETTER, Aug. 2010, available at http://www.riaclu.org/News/Newslet 
ters/2010Legislative.html.  
 123. R.I. CONST. art. 13, § 4.  
 124. See Moreau v. Flanders, 15 A.3d 565 (R.I. 2011). 
 125. Id. at 579. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. at 577. 
 128. See Kimhi, Reviving Cities, supra note 24, at 656–72.  
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fore the suspension of local democracy.  Early intervention has been 
consistently identified as a critical feature of successful state efforts.129   
Yet I doubt both the wisdom and efficacy of the new generation of 
state receivership laws.  I will leave it to pending litigation and other 
commenters to work through the significant legal vulnerabilities of 
the Michigan and Rhode Island statutes in terms of consistency with 
state and federal constitutional contract guarantees, labor law and 
collective bargaining rights, and home rule protections.  Instead, the 
analysis that follows uses the concept of democratic dissolution first 
as an interpretative tool to separate the new legislation from the state 
takeovers of the past, and second as a normative tool to highlight the 
deficits in the new laws.  In this Part, I explain democratic dissolution, 
critique the receivership reforms, and propose a more balanced rec-
onciliation of the vital interests within and beyond a city experiencing 
fiscal distress.  
A. A Definition 
The receivership laws passed in Michigan and Rhode Island pre-
serve the municipal corporate form, thus leaving its territorial bound-
aries undisturbed.  Yet they functionally suspend the municipal gov-
ernment for the duration of the receivership, giving the state-
appointed receiver the power to suspend the city’s charter and revoke 
any substantive authority held by elected officials.  Charter provisions 
relating to matters such as elections, public meetings, form of gov-
ernment, and staffing requirements are all set aside.  
The concept of “democratic dissolution” offered in this paper aims 
to capture this removal of the city’s government without the termina-
tion of the city’s corporate form.  The concept of dissolution is ex-
pressive of the degree of local government annulment permitted by 
these laws. The dissolutions enacted in Michigan and Rhode Island, 
however, are incomplete: they enact a democratic, but not a financial, 
dissolution.   
Understanding this argument requires an introduction to true dis-
solution.  In the context of local government law, dissolution refers to 
the termination or revocation of an incorporated municipality’s char-
ter and the reversion of the city’s territory to dependence on county 
 
 129. See, e.g., Berman, supra note 26, at 63; Coe, supra note 28; Kimhi, Reviving 
Cities, supra note 24; Philip Kloha et al., Someone to Watch over Me: State Monitor-
ing of Local Fiscal Conditions, 35 AM. REV. PUB. ADMIN. 236, 236–37 (2005). 
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or township government.130  The implications of true dissolution are 
numerous: layoffs of all local public employees and officials; reorgan-
ization of an entity’s revenues, assets, contracts, and debts; cessation 
or reassignment of local services; and nullification of a body of local 
laws.  Over the long term, dissolution can lead to restructuring or rec-
reation of one or more city governments over the same territory, but 
for the near term, the legal city is eliminated.  A city that dissolves 
may not be dead in any way visible to the naked eye—it may be pop-
ulated, and it may “retain markers of placehood and identity” like a 
name used by the Census and the Post Office.131  Dissolution, then, 
describes the death of the legal corporate form and the associated 
municipal government. 
Once limited to ghost towns, dissolution of populated cities is be-
coming more common as a means of restructuring in the face of eco-
nomic stress.  In a recent article, I identified an increase in dissolution 
activity by struggling cities across the country.  Since 2000, at least 130 
municipal governments have dissolved, a number higher than the to-
tal number of recorded dissolutions in the rest of the twentieth centu-
ry.132  Dissolutions were triggered by slow economic decline or acute 
fiscal crisis, with secondary themes of tax control, racial dynamics, 
and management reform emerging in significant numbers of cities.133  
The rationale for dissolution in the face of fiscal crisis or incompetent 
local government is twofold: (1) to cut the costs associated with run-
ning the city government itself; and (2) to merge the city’s territory 
with a larger land area in order to aggregate a larger revenue base 
and improve economies of scale in service provision.   
While one might imagine that state officials would pursue such re-
structuring goals for innumerable small towns across the country in 
the name of tax control and government streamlining, it is vanishingly 
rare—nearly non-existent in the modern era—for a state to dissolve a 
city without local consent.134  This rarity conveys something im-
portant:  States have made and maintained deep commitments, both 
legal and political, to local autonomy.135  Dissolution without local 
 
 130. Michelle Wilde Anderson, Dissolving Cities, 121 YALE L.J. 1364, 1367–68 
(2012).   
 131. Id. at 1368. 
 132. Id. at 1366.  
 133. See id. at 1399–1418. 
 134. Id. at 1368, 1377–78. 
 135. See id. at 1377.  
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consent has simply not been part of the toolbox for addressing fiscal 
crisis. 
Michigan and Rhode Island change this picture, but not by dissolv-
ing the borders of struggling cities and merging them into the unin-
corporated territories of townships or counties without the cities’ con-
sent.  Instead, the dissolutions enacted under these laws are 
incomplete—they dissolve democratic self-rule for the city, but they 
do not merge its territory or its budget with larger land areas or larger 
governments.  The economic restructuring goals described above (i.e., 
changing the taxable land base or population of the local govern-
ments that serve a given territory) cannot be achieved by changing 
who governs within fixed municipal borders.  Thus, the reforms do 
not seek, and cannot achieve, a major fiscal restructuring that relieves 
a struggling area of the costs of sustaining an independent municipal 
government through existing revenues.  Indeed, the receivership re-
forms do not even necessarily offer new financial assistance or loans 
from the state to help cover the municipality’s obligations, which was 
a traditional feature of state receiverships.  Even the emergency man-
ager’s salary and the costs of her staff and administration must be 
covered by local revenue.136   
Democratic dissolution differs from true dissolution in one other 
critical respect.  True dissolution means that residents of the former 
city’s territory will look to township or county officials as their most 
proximate governments.  The new state receiverships, by contrast, 
represent a centralization of political power all the way up to the state 
level.137  More narrowly than that, they confine all oversight authority 
within the state executive branch rather than state representative 
government as a whole.  For cities under receivership, where a major-
ity of voters align with a different political party than that of the gov-
ernor, the state level audience for local concerns about an emergency 
manager’s decisions may be, as a practical matter, deaf. 
 One might argue that the temporary, though indefinite, nature of 
the emergency manager terms contemplated by these laws should 
spare them the implicit critique in the term “democratic dissolution.”  
State receivership terms are intended to be temporary—a step taken 
 
 136. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 141.1515(5)(e); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 45-9-7(c). 
 137. True dissolution can theoretically mean that territory dissolves into state, as 
opposed to county, control. Anderson, supra note 130, at 1376 n.31.  Such is the case 
in Maine, where sparsely populated municipalities can revert to “disorganized terri-
tories” dependent directly on the state. Id.  But in such cases, the disorganized terri-
tory and its budget will fall under the exclusive authority of state elected officials—
no local government means no separate local territory for budgeting purposes. Id. 
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to stabilize the local government in its current territorial borders and 
return the area to control by the same municipality.  Yet the full legal 
dissolution of a municipality need not be permanent either.  A new 
legal city can incorporate all or part of the same territory following a 
dissolution.138  Dissolutions followed by the incorporation of one or 
more new cities over the same territory may be undesirable, even re-
gressive from the point of view of redistribution, but the point re-
mains that a complete dissolution is actually more amenable to struc-
tural reform than democratic dissolution, because legal dissolution 
allows the mapping and chartering of new local governments accord-
ing to local political will, changing times, and cost-revenue realities.  
Complete dissolution and democratic dissolution both shut down a 
local government for an indefinite period of time; the fact that emer-
gency managers do not stay forever does not redeem or legitimate 
these laws.  Even martial law eventually ends.  
Democratic dissolution is a useful concept for understanding the 
Michigan and Rhode Island laws and their differences from prior 
generations of municipal insolvency law, even if one does not take a 
strong normative position on the reforms.  Democratic dissolution 
captures the centralization of state power taking place and acknowl-
edges the incapacitation of local officials.  Where state receiverships 
were historically coupled with bailout funds or loans to stabilize the 
local government, democratic dissolution entails appointment of a re-
placement government.  By marking a break with prior generations of 
state receivership laws, the term should remind legislators and the 
public of the need for transparency, objectivity, and clear sunset rules 
in state receivership legislation.   
Separately, but significantly, I hope that the language of democrat-
ic dissolution reminds us that cities experiencing true fiscal meltdown 
may need more of a fresh start than a temporary management turno-
ver.  We should focus on more dramatic opportunities for restructur-
ing to address underlying defects in a city’s form.  As articulated fur-
ther in section II-C below, such defects might be assuaged by actual 
dissolution of a floundering city, including dissolutions that precede 
consolidation among cities in the region.  
 
 138. Indeed, one of the most significant proposed dissolutions in national history 
took place in the city of Miami. See Anderson, supra note 130, at 1373–74.  Dissolu-
tion proponents sought to dissolve the city back into the unincorporated land of the 
county, only to incorporate new, smaller, and wealthier cities. Id.  Whatever one 
might think of the desirability of that restructuring, it nonetheless indicates that dis-
solution need not be permanent. 
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B. A Critique  
On April 19, 2012, Governor Synder of Michigan appointed an 
emergency manager to run Muskegon Heights School District, a high- 
poverty district in the Grand Rapids metropolitan area that is facing 
operating deficits, falling student enrollment, and indebtedness to the 
state government.139  One month later, the emergency manager issued 
termination notices to all teachers and staff in the district and posted 
a request for proposals from private organizations to operate the dis-
trict as a charter school system.140  Muskegon Heights School District 
is thus set to become a highly experimental system of public school 
governance—apparently the first privatization of a full school district 
in the country—on the orders of a state appointee.  In accordance 
with the requirements in Michigan’s new receivership law, the emer-
gency manager explained his plan to the public but did not solicit 
public input or approval.141   
Is this kind of strong management good for cities and school dis-
tricts in crisis?  We cannot yet know how Muskegon Heights will fare 
in its conversion to a chartered district, but as the number of cities 
and school districts under amplified receiverships ticks upwards, it is 
critical to evaluate these laws on their face.  After identifying policy 
values by which to judge state receivership laws, this Part assesses the 
new statutes’ trade-offs among these values.  I look at both procedur-
al and substantive dimensions of the new generation of receivership 
reforms: procedurally, the legal process by which an emergency man-
 
 139. See supra note 55; Michigan School District Demographic Profiles, PROXIMI-
TY, http://proximityone.com/mi_sdc.htm (Quick Start search: topic “DP3” for “Mus-
kegon Heights School District”); see also “Governor Snyder Determines a ‘Financial 
Emergency’ Exists in Muskegon Heights Schools,” Press Release from the State of 
Michigan Department of Treasury (April 10, 2012), available at platform.publicbroad 
casting.net/MHS_GovernorDetermination_4-10-2012.pdf. 
 140. OFFICE OF THE EMERGENCY MANAGER DONALD B. WEATHERSPOON, ORDER 
2012-4: DIRECTING THE ISSUANCE OF NOTICES OF LAYOFFS TO DISTRICT EMPLOYEES, 
May 16, 2012, available at http://www.mhpsnet.org/EM.htm; OFFICE OF THE EMER-
GENCY MANAGER DONALD B. WEATHERSPOON, ORDER 2012-5: ORDER ISSUING RE-
QUESTS FOR APPLICATIONS (RFAS) SEEKING PROPOSALS TO ORGANIZE AND OPER-
ATE THE MUSKEGON HEIGHTS PUBLIC CHARTER SYSTEM, May 25, 2012 available at 
http://www.mhpsnet.org/EM.htm; see also Draft Financial and Operating Plan for the 
School District of the City of Muskegon Heights, CITY OF MUSKEGON HEIGHTS 
SCHOOL DISTRICT 16 (May 25, 2012), available at http://www.mhpsnet.org/EM.htm 
(providing that “the Manager has decided to discontinue the direct provision of pub-
lic educational services by the District at the end of the 2011–2012 school year. The 
Manager will authorize a charter for a public school academy to provide public edu-
cational services at one or more public schools in a unified system of public schools to 
be known as the Muskegon Heights Public School Academy System.”). 
 141. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 141.1518(4) (2011). 
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ager is put in place, and substantively, the rules of city governance 
during a period of receivership.  
The normative desirability of these laws should be measured 
against broad sets of values reflective of local democracy and good 
government in an area experiencing dramatic fiscal stress.  In my 
view, the most critical such values are the following: (1) local health, 
safety, and welfare, including the particular needs and conditions of 
high-poverty communities; (2) democratic values, including electoral 
accountability, public transparency, access to government, and fair-
ness; (3) public integrity, specifically the control of self-dealing or cor-
ruption; (4) efficiency, including cost-effective public services, admin-
istration, borrowing, and spending; and (5) the management of 
negative externalities affecting other cities and the state (including 
the credit worthiness of these governments). 
All of these values are important—indeed, fundamental.  Severe 
fiscal crisis will inevitably put some of them in tension with others, so 
much so that legislatures will naturally be tempted to give up on cer-
tain values for the duration of fiscal exigency.  Complete suspension 
of any such fundamental tenets of local governance, however, should 
not be available even in the worst of times, whether it is a recession or 
the aftermath of a hurricane.  Each value is simply too foundational 
to the purpose and legitimacy of government, and each one is so in-
terconnected that it cannot be sacrificed without collateral damage to 
others.  Efficiency values, for instance, rely on public integrity ones, 
which depend on democratic values like electoral accountability and 
transparency.   
The core problem with the statutes in Michigan and Rhode Island 
is that legislators fell prey to the illusion that by entirely sacrificing 
one of these value sets, local democracy, they could ameliorate local 
fiscal crisis.  They also set one public policy value above all others: the 
management of negative externalities, i.e., the preservation of munic-
ipal creditworthiness and bond markets in the state.  In elevating this 
objective—even though, paradoxically, that objective lies farthest be-
yond a receiver’s control—they explicitly eliminated local democracy 
and effectively demoted or endangered all of the other values.   
Proceeding more carefully through this argument, the receivership 
laws discussed in this Article declare that a fiscal crisis leaves no time 
for local democracy.  The formula for recovery is appealingly simple:  
If we get the city government out of the way, more efficient service 
provision will follow from the same budgetary resources, and the re-
ceiver’s strong hand will restore investor confidence in the state’s 
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municipal bond markets.  To carry out this formula, the laws take 
four radical and highly problematic steps.  First, they consolidate all 
local authority into a single unelected official, thus nullifying the local 
form of government (such as a separation of executive and legislative 
functions) provided under state law or a city charter.  While local 
governments are generally not governed by a formal separation of 
powers rule,142 states and their citizens have long signaled deference 
and respect for local choice as to the form of municipal government, 
most notably through home rule provisions in state constitutions.143  
The new laws retract that feature of local autonomy, entrusting a sin-
gle outsider to the full function and responsibility of a government.  
They mark the triumph of the bureaucratic manager over messy par-
ticipatory democracy.   
The second move to “get city government out of the way” is to em-
power the governor to select that singular local official and then hold 
him or her accountable to the state executive branch.  The laws sacri-
fice voter participation and deliberative democracy values, from the 
empowerment and educative roles of local participation to the pub-
lic’s trust and respect for local government.  Recourse to state gov-
ernment is available, of course, but the state is distant and its elec-
torate is comparatively vast.  Our legal system has thus long 
recognized that democratic participation and voting power are affect-
ed by proximity to government.144  So too does our jurisprudence on 
local democracy recognize that consolidating several local elected of-
ficials into a single leader, or changing from an elected to an appoint-
ed official, can dilute voting rights.145  By consolidating local authority 
 
 142. See Citizens for Reform v. Citizens for Open Gov’t, Inc., 931 So. 2d 977, 989–
90 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (citing precedent from thirteen states). 
 143. See, e.g., R.I. CONST. art. XIII, § 1 (granting every city and town in the state 
the “right of self government in all local matters”); id. § 4 (“The general assembly 
shall have the power to act in relation to property, affairs and government of any city 
or town by general laws which shall apply alike to all cities and towns, but which shall 
not affect the form of government of any city or town.”) (emphasis added). 
 144. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 49–50 (1973) 
(lauding the virtues of “local control,” which offers “freedom,” “participation,” adap-
tation to “local needs,” “experimentation,” “competition,” “a multiplicity of view-
points,” and “a diversity of approaches”).   
 145. For that reason, a change in the number of elected officials within a district is 
both a “standard, practice, or procedure” under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 
1965 (though a Court plurality held that minority voters could not challenge the dilu-
tive effects of such a change), and a “standard, practice, or procedure with respect to 
voting” under Section 5 of the Act. See Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 886 (1994) 
(O’Connor, J., concurring) (finding that under both Section 2 and Section 5 of the 
Voting Rights Act, the size of a governing body is a covered change); id. at 946 
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in a state official, the laws provide a categorical answer to a 
longstanding debate in local government theory: Are local govern-
ments miniature democracies legally entitled to autonomy, or are 
they administrative subdivisions of state government subject to the 
revocation of their authority?146  Rhode Island and Michigan gave an 
emphatic answer:  Whatever local governments are in their prime, a 
fiscal crisis demotes them to the status of arms of the state.147 
The third problematic legislative move to suspend local democracy 
is to withdraw transparency and public accountability mechanisms at 
the local level, implementing, at most, a “don’t ask, just tell” policy 
for communications.  Rhode Island sets no requirements for public 
communication, and Michigan only requires that emergency manag-
ers present their financial and operations plans to the public at an in-
formational hearing thirty days into the manager’s tenure.148  These 
reports to the public fall far short of open meeting and sunshine laws, 
 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“Five Justices today agree that the size of a governing 
body is a ‘standard, practice, or procedure’ under § 2”).  In Holder v. Hall, the Court 
directly considered the application of a Section 2 vote dilution claim to governing 
body size in a challenge to a county governed by a single commissioner who held all 
legislative and executive authority. See id. at 885 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (finding 
that Court precedent “compel[s] the conclusion” that Section 5 of the Voting Rights 
Act covers changes in the size of a governing body); see also Lockhart v. United 
States, 460 U.S. 125, 131–32 (1983) (holding Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act appli-
cable to an increase in the number of city councilors); City of Rome v. United States, 
446 U.S. 156, 161 (1980) (holding that increasing the size of a board of education was 
“within the purview of the Act” and subject to preclearance under Section 5); Presley 
v. Etowah Cnty. Comm’n, 502 U.S. 491, 503, 506–07 (1992) (stating that Section 5 of 
the Voting Rights Act does require preclearance of changes that “increase or dimin-
ish the number of officials for whom the electorate may vote” because such changes 
affect voting power, though also holding that no such preclearance is required where 
changes alter “the relative authority of various governmental officials” or “alter[] an 
elected official’s powers” because such changes do not affect voting itself). 
 146. This central question was first articulated in this form by Richard Briffault.  
See Richard Briffault, Who Rules at Home? One Person/One Vote and Local Gov-
ernments, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 339, 339, 346–48 (1993) (arguing that the Supreme 
Court relies on two competing conceptions of local governments as “locally repre-
sentative bodies” or as “arms of the states”). 
 147. An important legal issue thus follows: Did the state reserve the power to an-
nul local autonomy in this way?  This Article does not venture into state-specific 
analysis of that question, though, as noted, I found the Rhode Island Supreme 
Court’s recent decision on the matter to be poorly reasoned.  See supra notes 122 to 
127 and accompanying text; Moreau v. Flanders, 15 A.3d 565 (R.I. 2011).  A similar 
legal challenge to the emergency manager reforms is currently pending before the 
Michigan Supreme Court. See Brown v. Snyder, No. 11-685-CZ (Mich. Ct. Cl. June 
22, 2011), available at http://op.bna.com/dlrcases.nsf/r?Open=edue-8j4qjt; supra notes 
72-75 and accompanying text. 
 148. Compare MICH. COMP. LAWS § 141.1518(4) (2011), with R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. 
§ 45-9-7 (West 2010).   
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and indeed Governor Snyder’s administration has taken the position 
that open meeting laws do not apply to the meetings of the state fiscal 
review board that chooses cities for intervention and hires emergency 
managers.149  This policy is both unsound and delegitimizing.  Open 
meeting laws allow journalists and members of the public to follow 
and scrutinize policymaking, and they engage the public in delibera-
tion over important policy decisions.  They are a primary backstop to 
corruption. 
Last but not least, the new receiver laws betray local democracy 
values because they do not require local consent, i.e., the receivers 
are not requested or approved by local elected officials or citizens.  
This feature distinguishes the new laws from even the strongest state 
receivership in the past, namely an ad hoc state intervention to stabi-
lize the finances of Chelsea, Massachusetts in 1991.  There, a state-
appointed receiver replaced the city’s mayor and demoted the city’s 
governing body to advisory status, and the receiver had strong powers 
to reorganize Chelsea’s government and its budget.150  Eventual fiscal 
recovery in Chelsea indicates that there are gains to be had in concen-
trating authority in a receiver, but that case differed significantly from 
the democratic dissolution discussed in this Article, because Chelsea’s 
receivership was initiated and approved by the city itself.151  As such, 
it was much less susceptible to antagonism (not to mention lawsuits) 
by displaced local officials, as well as state-local conflict and political 
polarization.  Indiana apparently recognized this defect of the Michi-
gan and Rhode Island bills, because although it recently amended its 
own emergency manager law in the shadow of the other two states’ 
reforms, Indiana continues to require that the elected officials of a 
distressed unit formally petition for state assistance.152   
These moves to set aside local democracy values are problematic 
on their own terms.  Yet even so, temporary democratic suspension 
by a state would be more justifiable if emergency managers were 
simply number crunchers who stopped the leakage of public money to 
unauthorized or wasteful purposes and could thereby balance the lo-
cal budget.  If things were that easy, state receiverships might well re-
store public trust, make local government more efficient, and stabilize 
 
 149. See Davis v. City of Detroit Financial Review Team, No. 309482 (Mich. Ct. 
App. May 21, 2012) available at http://michiganlawyerblog.wordpress.com/tag/emer 
gency-financial-manager/. 
 150. Berman, supra note 26, at 63–64.   
 151. Id., at 63.   
 152. See Ind. Code § 6-1.1-20.3-6; HB 1192, 117th Gen. Assemb., 2nd Sess. (Ind. 
2012), available at: http://www.in.gov/legislative/bills/2012/HE/HE1192.1.html. 
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municipal creditworthiness within and beyond the municipality.  But 
we cannot assume such idealized returns from the receiverships per-
mitted by the new laws.  Fiscal crisis is nothing if not complicated, and 
emergency managers are, alas, mortal.  Furthermore, the way these 
laws are crafted means that all the local public policy values of great-
est concern—namely, health and safety, democratic values, public in-
tegrity, efficiency, and the control of negative externalities—are put 
in peril, both in spite of and because of the decision to suspend local 
self-government.  I walk through the basis for this conclusion in the 
paragraphs that follow.  
The first cluster of risks that emerges from the suspension of local 
democracy is related to the content and quality of decisions by a state 
received appointed under the conditions described here.  Receivers’ 
rushed timeline for decisionmaking and the lack of public accounta-
bility makes it more likely that local governments will sell assets un-
der value and enter private contracts for services that fail to protect 
the public interest over the long term.  For example, the emergency 
manager in Pontiac, Michigan sold the disused Pontiac Silverdome 
(which cost $55 million to build) for $580,000 to a Toronto-based 
company—a “firesale” price reflecting the depths of the recession, 
but money that the manager said was necessary to relieve the city of 
maintenance costs.153  That price was a stunning fall from the $20 mil-
lion allegedly offered by a minority-owned, Michigan-based company 
several years before.154  In addition, the lack of transparency and ac-
countability makes the receivers themselves susceptible to capture by 
special interests, if not self-dealing and corruption.  Pontiac exhibits 
this concern as well:  The very same receiver in the City of Pontiac 
who sold the Silverdome then joined the buyer’s company after leav-
ing the emergency manager post.155  Or as another example, from 
2005 to 2006, an emergency manager appointed in Highland Park, 
Michigan allegedly misappropriated $264,000 in city funds.156  Receiv-
ership legislation must assume that emergency managers are as sus-
ceptible to capture and self-dealing as the local officials they replace. 
 
 153. Alex P. Kellogg, Judge Declines to Block Sale of Pontiac Silverdome, WALL 
ST. J. (Nov. 24, 2009), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125903125547961739.html. 
 154. Id. 
 155. The Rachel Maddow Show: The Plundering of Pontiac (MSNBC television 
broadcast May 12, 2012) available at http://video.msnbc.msn.com/the-rachel-maddow 
-show/47395558#47395558. 
 156. Jeff T. Wattrick, Jury Orders Ex-Highland Park EFM Art Blackwell to Repay 
$264,000; Why Did He Even Have that Job?, MLIVE.COM (June 8, 2011), http://www. 
mlive.com/news/detroit/index.ssf/2011/06/jury_orders_ex-highland_park_e.html. 
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Perhaps these concerns would be less significant if emergency 
managers did not have substantial public policy authority.  On the 
contrary, however, emergency managers have the power to make 
dramatic local policy changes within and beyond fiscal matters.  In 
particular, their leadership has been characterized by the privatiza-
tion of asset management, sales of public assets, and the outsourcing 
of service provision to the private sector.  The sale of the Pontiac 
Silverdome and the privatization of Muskegon Heights School Dis-
trict, each described above, offer just two examples.  Reasonable 
minds disagree about the advantages of a stronger role for the private 
sector in delivery of public goods, but it should be beyond dispute 
that privatization constitutes a significant public policy shift.  When 
such decisions are made while local democracy is suspended, they 
lose legitimacy and raise concerns about political capture at the state 
level, where private contractors may enjoy a higher level of influence 
and access under certain state administrations.  Just as privatization 
signifies an important and durable policy change, so too do cancella-
tions or reductions in services.  Here again, public input, approval, or 
discourse about service priorities is important for the integrity as well 
as the efficiency of long-term reform in public services.  
The second main set of reasons the new state receiverships are like-
ly to do more harm than good is that they risk severe collateral dam-
age to local health, safety, and welfare values.  The laws fail to ad-
dress the structural causes of fiscal deterioration, and therefore they 
leave the emergency managers with few tools other than service cuts.  
At root, this defect reflects the laws’ limited vision of the causes of 
municipal insolvency.  By remediating the crisis only by replacing lo-
cal government with state-appointed experts, the laws reflect theories 
of fiscal crisis that assume that local management—or more to the 
point, mismanagement—is solely to blame for fiscal meltdown.  The 
laws reflect the theory that local governments fail because of: first, the 
competence and/or integrity limitations of municipal officials; and se-
cond, defects in the local political economy, particularly the domi-
nance of a narrow band of special interests in local politics.157  As de-
scribed in Part I-A, this view does not take into account external 
causes of fiscal decline, like state and regional job losses, socioeco-
nomic decline, and racial discrimination in employment, housing, and 
education.158  A receivership law built without regard to these exter-
nal causes will be too narrowly focused on replacing local officials and 
 
 157. Kimhi, Reviving Cities, supra note 24, at 642–46. 
 158. See supra notes 33–34 and accompanying text. 
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breaking the power of local special interests, including public em-
ployee unions.  The laws assume the superior wisdom and capacity of 
emergency managers in all domains of policy, from operations to zon-
ing.  Their provisions regarding collective bargaining159 reveal the 
view that it is public employee unions alone—as opposed to other lo-
cal special interests, like developers, private contractors, major local 
employers, or others—whose influence must be forcibly diluted in lo-
cal politics.  While all these parties are critical to fiscal recovery, so 
too are unions.  Public employee unions are, after all, simply pools of 
people who work, consume, and potentially live in the city.  In an area 
of very concentrated poverty, they are likely to represent a critical 
share of the local working and middle class.  
Yet the statistics from Benton Harbor, offered in the introduction 
to this paper, remind us that there are structural reasons that cities 
flounder.160  Historic racial discrimination and segregation policies 
built the racial and socioeconomic polarization of Benton Harbor 
from its neighbors.161  These policies reveal their ongoing impact in 
nearly pure racial segregation in the county today, as well as the ex-
tremely high levels of poverty concentrated in Benton Harbor in con-
trast to Berrien County as a whole.162  Add to that external forces—
like the meltdown of manufacturing jobs on which Benton Harbor 
and much of Michigan’s population depended163—and the story of 
success and failure in the state’s municipalities looks much more 
complicated than defective leadership. 
The poverty rates in Benton Harbor and other cities under emer-
gency management also make the point that the population of the lo-
cal government’s territory may be an unwise—and unjust—choice to 
bear the costs and risks of municipal insolvency.  The high poverty 
rates make the city extremely vulnerable to further cuts in basic ser-
vices and virtually incapable of producing additional tax revenues.  
 
 159. See supra notes 45–49 and accompanying text; supra notes 90–91 and accom-
panying text; MICH. COMP. LAWS § 141.1519(g)–(k); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 45-9-9.   
 160. Omer Kimhi has classified these explanations for fiscal distress as falling with-
in a “socio-economic decline approach.” Kimhi, Reviving Cities, supra note 24, at 
638–42. 
 161. See supra notes 4–11 and accompanying text. 
 162. The poverty rate in Benton Harbor is 48.7%, compared with 16.4% in the 
county as a whole. Benton Harbor Economics Census, supra note 4; Berrier County, 
Michigan—Selected Economic Characteristics, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU [hereinafter 
Berrier County Economics Census], http://factfinder2.census.gov/faces/nav/jsf/pages/ 
index.xhtml (Quick Start search: topic “DP03” for “Berrier County, Michigan”; then 
follow “2010 ACS 5-year estimates” hyperlink). 
 163. Mahler, supra note 6, at 38. 
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Scholar Omer Kimhi put it well: “Local economic failure does not jus-
tify leaving the residents without education or police, and the compe-
tition among localities should not cast away localities or leave resi-
dents behind.”164  The emergency manager of the Detroit public 
schools who launched a plan to radically consolidate schools in the 
city165 inadvertently illustrated Kimhi’s point by forcing the question: 
Is it good public policy for class sizes to soar in Detroit, the state’s 
most populous city?  Are children the appropriate bearers of the risk 
of municipal insolvency?   
In assessing the landscape of tools available to address local fiscal 
crises (including bankruptcy and traditional creditor’s remedies 
through judicial receiverships), Kimhi argued that residents’ limited 
ability to produce more revenue, bear service cuts, or substantively 
influence local budgeting meant that they were a poor choice as bear-
ers of municipal insolvency risk.166  Neither residents nor local offi-
cials have strong tools to address macroeconomic changes like manu-
facturing decline or socioeconomic patterns like the flight of wealth to 
suburban municipalities.167  And even where public employee unions 
and local politicians signed retirement or compensation agreements 
that the city could not afford, the city’s population is likely nonethe-
less to depend heavily on those city workers for public safety and 
economic development.  At the time he wrote, it appeared that mu-
nicipal insolvency legislation, unlike the alternative routes of Chapter 
9 and creditor remedies, inevitably made the state—not residents—
the risk bearers.168  Yet the Michigan and Rhode Island reforms mark 
a turning point at which municipal insolvency legislation makes resi-
dents the primary bearers of the costs of fiscal crisis—emergency 
management comes without state aid, tax reform, new financing lev-
ers, or other means to change the big picture of the city budget.  In-
stead, emergency managers must take desperate measures.  For in-
stance, in impoverished Benton Harbor, the state appointee tried to 
address high delinquency rates on user fees for trash service by com-
bining garbage and water bills.169  His theory was that having the wa-
 
 164. See Kimhi, Reviving Cities, supra note 24, at 673. 
 165. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.   
 166. See Kimhi, Reviving Cities, supra note 24, at 656–60.  Clayton Gillette has 
made a related but distinct argument that bondholders may be superior bearers of 
risk when it comes to municipal default, as compared to city residents, due to their 
advantages as fiscal monitors. See Gillette, Bondholders, supra note 24, at 664–70. 
 167. See id., at 638–42. 
 168. See id., at 673–78. 
 169. Mahler, supra note 6, at 41. 
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ter shut off would hurt so much that residents would find some way to 
pay their trash bills.170  Such changes at the margins of reform surely 
inflict more harm than the revenue they generate. 
State receivership laws should be built to respond to structural un-
derstandings of why cities struggle financially.  The laws’ current as-
sumption seems to be that if there were simply more competence, 
more technical expertise, less corruption, and weaker public employ-
ees unions, cities would recover.  That narrow view is belied by the 
reality that even emergency managers empowered with the maximum 
degree of authority have no magic wand to overcome systemic, long-
term decline.  Indeed, Central Falls, Rhode Island, itself provides an 
example: after a year under two emergency managers with impressive 
management pedigrees and over $1.4 million of compensation and le-
gal fees associated with the takeover itself, Central Falls still ended up 
in municipal bankruptcy.171  Put simply, there is ample reason to think 
that the reforms in Michigan and Rhode Island will not work. 
The question remains, however, even if the laws will not work ac-
cording to the full set of values that I advance here, will they achieve 
the goal they most sought, the containment of contagion effects?  In 
other words, can the laws limit the risk that municipal default will 
spread to markets for the municipal bonds of fiscally healthy munici-
palities?  Clayton Gillette has argued that empirical evidence of actu-
al contagion impacts is mixed, but the perception of that risk by mar-
kets and by legislators is real.172  Yet the range of evidence on the 
question has been developed in more traditional circumstances—
state bailouts of distressed municipalities.  The new legal era de-
scribed in this Article is experimenting with the stronger medicine of 
democratic dissolution without additional state aid or loans.  Legisla-
tors seem to believe that rational investors will be reassured by the 
exaggerated concentration of power with emergency managers, espe-
cially the power to break contracts with unions and others.  It is not 
yet possible to know if they are correct, but one proposition should 
nonetheless govern:  A state should see substantial change in the cre-
ditworthiness of both healthy and ailing municipalities if it is to con-
tinue exacting such extreme sacrifices of democratic, public integrity, 
and health and safety values.  At this point, the legislatures in Michi-
gan and Rhode Island are just casting bets in favor of that proposi-
tion, and along the way, their gamble is resulting in deep budget cuts 
 
 170. Id. 
 171. Hill, supra note 98; Shedlock, supra note 107. 
 172. See Gillette, Fiscal Federalism, supra note 24, at 302–08. 
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and asset sales in some of the poorest communities in their states.  
Given the paucity of empirical evidence supporting this bet, one natu-
rally wonders whether in fact, it was not contagion containment that 
drove these legislatures after all.  Instead, it may have been ideologi-
cal commitments to cutting local budgets, selling local assets, and out-
sourcing local services—i.e., shrinking and privatizing local govern-
ment—that were the true objectives behind the reforms.  Indeed, 
conservative representatives in Rhode Island’s General Assembly 
have made it clear that they view receiverships as a promising means 
of forcing reductions in the scale of local government.173  
This brings us to the final risk of the municipal insolvency reforms, 
that following a receivership, critical political legitimacy and partici-
pation assets at the local level may be damaged, with heightened lo-
cal-state political polarization and lower rates of local electoral partic-
ipation.  One must wonder, in essence, what happens after a 
receivership is over.  Where a receivership was unwelcomed by the 
local electorate, which media reports suggest is the case in most of the 
jurisdictions covered in this Article, the elected local officials that 
have been sidelined may await their chance to return to power and 
reverse policy changes made by the receiver.  And logic would indi-
cate (here again, we are in unchartered empirical territory) that in 
high poverty electorates, moves like shutting off water service for un-
paid garbage bills (the emergency manager’s policy in Benton Har-
bor, noted above) will be wildly unpopular, if not demoralizing to a 
beleaguered public. In Michigan, this is an even more predictable 
outcome, given the partisan rancor and racially disparate impact of 
receiverships on minority cities.  
Defenders of the laws, including Michigan’s Governor Snyder, 
have emphasized that the status quo is not an option for cities that are 
truly facing a fiscal crisis.174  That is certainly true—there are few 
painless options in the face of fiscal insolvency.  Bankruptcy, for in-
stance, is certainly no panacea.  The recent history in Vallejo, Cali-
fornia has shown that cities with severe structural problems left to 
face bankruptcy emerge even more battered than before they went in, 
with severe public safety and land market consequences that will fur-
 
 173. See supra notes 119–21 and accompanying text. 
 174. See, e.g., Editorial, Calling the Shots on Insolvency—What Is It About the 
Word ‘Crisis’ that Some Don’t Understand?, KALAMAZOO GAZETTE, Mar. 20, 2011, 
at A9. 
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ther slow recovery.175  But so too is it deceptive for our public debate 
to frame local leaders and public employee unions as simple villains, 
as if the primary defect in local management is the inability to break 
union contracts and restrain unions from future political influence 
over weak local leaders.  Systemic challenges require systemic re-
forms—municipal leadership and rent seeking by public employees 
cannot bear sole responsibility for financial insolvency.  A democratic 
freeze in the spirit of martial law is not a wise or ethical response to 
fiscal stress, especially when it is premised on uncertain and potential-
ly unsound claims that emergency management can limit overflow 
harms to other local governments. 
In short, the Michigan and Rhode Island laws go too far in sus-
pending local democracy and ascribing fiscal crisis to matters internal 
to a city’s territorial boundaries, particularly its leaders and union 
politics.  They do too little, by contrast, at addressing the underlying 
causes of persistent socioeconomic decline. 
C. Tempering Reforms 
For the sake of other states considering enactment of or revisions 
to municipal insolvency legislation, as well as for Michigan and 
Rhode Island, where the new laws are generating intensive legal and 
political opposition, I offer a set of reforms to the Michigan and 
Rhode Island laws that promise a better balance among the values 
identified in the prior Section.  The reforms offered here span several 
dimensions of these laws: (1) their triggering conditions, (2) the pro-
cedure for appointment and selection of emergency managers, (3) the 
authority granted to receivers, (4) receiver oversight, and (5) closure 
of the receivership period.  Taken together, the reforms seek greater 
transparency and uniformity in application, increased input from lo-
cal, elected leaders in receivership processes, more consultation and 
engagement with the public, greater funding from the state, and de-
velopment of a process for seeking structural reform. 
Triggering Conditions.  Due to the high costs of revoking local 
democratic self-rule, states must be held to strict, objective, and uni-
formly applicable criteria for appointing emergency managers.  Broad 
statutory language, let alone open discretion, is an invitation for real 
and perceived unfairness in the state’s selection of struggling munici-
palities needing intervention.  When the stakes are so high, statutes 
 
 175. See Jonathan Weber, For Vallejo, Bankruptcy Isn’t Exactly a Fresh Start, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 22, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/23/us/23bcweber.html. 
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must control explicit and implicit biases held by state officials along 
political lines (i.e., contrasting partisan majorities at the state and lo-
cal level), as well as racial ones (i.e., a denigration of the efficacy of 
democratic self-government in majority African-American communi-
ties).  In the context of the Michigan state takeover of the Detroit 
public schools, for instance, one commenter noted that the “dynamics 
at work in the [Detroit public schools] takeover are amplified by a 
long history of what some would describe as racially-tinged acrimony 
between the city of Detroit and the rest of the state.”176  Whatever bi-
ases may be operational in fact, appointment of an emergency man-
ager in politically or racially distinctive cities will be understandably 
perceived as selective enforcement of the law in the absence of nar-
row, specific triggering conditions that bind the state to implement 
receiverships based on non-discretionary determinations. 
Rhode Island’s law, a prime example of this dangerously vague 
statutory language, only lists four general criteria for identifying a fis-
cal crisis sufficiently dire to trigger appointment of a receiver.  The 
provisions are so ambiguous that uniform state application would be 
impossible.177  Adding to the problem, the statute contains a blanket 
“fiscal emergency” criteria, which is undefined.178  Michigan’s law is 
more responsible, both because it contains more precise criteria179 
and because it requires a thirty-day and sixty-day staged review pro-
cess to determine a qualifying fiscal crisis.180  Nonetheless, the gover-
nor’s office and the state treasury department has not been forthcom-
ing about the cities under consideration for receiverships and the 
fiscal calculations from which its selections are being made.  More 
than two dozen cities are thought by journalists to be under scrutiny, 
but there is no basis for the public to determine how that number has 
been whittled down to the seven cities and school districts selected for 
intervention.181 
Appointment and Selection of the State Receiver.  Following the 
decision to appoint an emergency manager, the selection of that indi-
vidual is another critical and highly contestable step.  The selection 
process can either improve or undermine the local legitimacy and par-
 
 176. Bowman, supra note 40, at 928; see also id. at 927–28 (“[I]f the district is ra-
cially isolated, as so many districts are, members of the community may question 
whether the state intervention is racially-motivated.”).  
 177. See R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 45-9-5 (West 2010). 
 178. See id. §§ 45-9-8.   
 179. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 141.1514(3) (2011). 
 180. Id. §§ 141.1512(2), (3).   
 181. See supra note 57 and text accompanying notes 53–57. 
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ticipatory impacts of the law.  On the preliminary matter of eligibility, 
local public officials, whether elected or not, should be eligible to 
serve in the role of emergency manager.  If these laws are correct that 
a key barrier to reform is the powerlessness of local officials to over-
come the influence of special interests, then the laws should permit 
the possibility that existing officials, who earned electoral majorities 
and are familiar with the city’s finances and operations, may be in the 
best position to use the law’s augmented powers for curative ends.   
The Michigan law could have been worse on this score, given that 
an earlier version included a provision that cut in the opposite direc-
tion to that suggested here.  Namely, the earlier version would have 
enacted a six-year ban on elected officials in place at the time of re-
ceivership from running for office again.182  Such a provision ex-
pressed disdain for locally elected officials, if not blameworthiness for 
the city’s financial straits.  Such missives by the state are unwarranted, 
unwise, and delegitimizing. 
Emergency manager selection and appointment processes can also 
gain democratic and local legitimacy by involving a broader segment 
of officials.  Michigan gives the governor sole and discretionary selec-
tion rights,183 while Rhode Island gives such a right to the director of 
the Department of Revenue.184  Both laws have provoked accusations 
of centralization with unchecked discretion.  Instead, city and state 
leadership, as well as the general public, should be invited to nomi-
nate candidates for the position.  Selection should be made by a 
committee with a mix of state and local actors, with ex officio repre-
sentation as necessary. An adequately representative selection com-
mittee would include the following seats: (1) the governor, (2) the 
state official most responsible for public finance or administration, (3) 
the city’s mayor or chief executive, (4) the president (or a nominee) 
of the city council, (5) one state assemblyman serving a district in 
which the largest portion of the city’s population is located, (6) the 
state senator for the district in which the city is located, and (7) one 
member of the public.  With a simple majority vote to approve a nom-
ination, it is unlikely that such a committee would derail or unduly 
burden the selection of an emergency manager. 
The Receiver’s Authority.  Once the emergency manager is in 
place, the key question becomes: What powers will she wield over lo-
cal elected officials?  The recent history of emergency managers in 
 
 182. Bouffard, supra note 53. 
 183. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 141.1515(4). 
 184. See R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 45-9-7. 
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Michigan shows the difficulty of genuine power sharing.  In 2010, the 
year before passage of that state’s new emergency manager laws, the 
emergency manager of Pontiac, Michigan resigned from his post after 
“liken[ing] his tenure to working in a M*A*S*H* unit.”185  His resig-
nation was, in large part, due to a power struggle with the sitting 
mayor, who, in the emergency manager’s words, “‘strongly believed 
he should [have been] in charge of daily city operations.’”186  Func-
tionality, of course, is an important value in the design of state takeo-
ver laws, but so too is the local democracy embodied in the mayor’s 
claim to authority.   
If a state’s experience with receiverships in the past indicates that 
clear lines of authority are absolutely necessary to the receiver’s effi-
cacy, then that authority should come with a number of safeguards to 
protect the fundamental values described in Part II-B.  A state re-
ceiver’s authority in a time of crisis should be held in check by three 
conditions.  First is that all of the reforms and safeguards outlined in 
this section are in place, including narrowly defined triggering condi-
tions, a locally inclusive selection process, structural reform efforts, 
stronger state oversight, and clear sunset provisions.   
The second condition is that the elected officials for the city, in-
cluding both the mayor and city council, should retain their general 
governing authority.  Most critically, they should continue to control 
city land use law and policy, arguably the most powerful dimension of 
local authority when it comes to shaping a city and its revenues over 
the long term.  Essentially, this reform would limit the emergency 
manager to fiscal authority, including all control of revenues and 
spending.  Such authority should be defined by statute to include the 
power to operate, manage, and curtail services for the locale—critical 
tools for controlling spending locally.  If all other safeguards de-
scribed in this section are in place, I would even define that authority 
to include the power to contract out for the provision of services, as 
long as the contract term does not exceed the longer of five years or 
the length of the emergency manager’s first term (as limited by the 
statutory sunset provision, described below).  This fiscal authority, 
however, should be specifically defined to exclude the power to sell 
public land assets.  Though the receiver could dispose of other re-
placeable city property, such as by auctioning vehicles or terminating 
lease agreements, an emergency manager’s authority should not in-
 
 185. Jennifer Chambers & Mike Martindale, Pontiac’s Clashes Put Takeovers in 
Spotlight, DETROIT NEWS, June 18, 2010, at A13. 
 186.  Id. 
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clude the power to sell real property, which is among the most valua-
ble and non-fungible assets for economic development and land use 
planning in a city, even in a down market.  
The third essential provision is to restore the public accountability 
mechanisms established by the city charter or state general law, in-
cluding the schedule of public hearings and city council meetings.  
The elected mayor and city council should preside over these meet-
ings as they would normally, but with allocated time for a detailed re-
port from the emergency manager.  Though it might be messy at 
times, this arrangement would correct some of the most urgent demo-
cratic defects of the new receivership laws.  Some communication be-
tween the emergency manager, local elected officials, and the public 
is critical for reasons of accountability and oversight, as well as trans-
parency and legitimacy.  Though their authority over fiscal affairs is 
formally sidelined, the long-term efficacy of the city’s government 
depends upon voters’ and elected officials’ understanding of their 
city’s finances and operations.  It is hard to imagine a sustainable re-
covery if emergency managers toil in relative secrecy, then upon their 
exit, simply hand spreadsheets to re-empowered elected officials.  In 
addition, an emergency manager, who may have little prior 
knowledge of the city, can learn from elected officials about topics 
ranging from public priorities to past experiences with private con-
tractors.187  Alongside that trio of reforms, a formal suspension of the 
legal authority of elected officials will be both more legitimate and 
more effective. 
Within the question of an emergency manager’s powers, the most 
controversial matter is surely the right to alter existing collective bar-
gaining agreements; this is a key difference between current and prior 
generations of state receivership laws.  In my view, which is likely 
shared by contracts clause and labor law experts, Rhode Island’s 
more moderate position with respect to collective bargaining (i.e., giv-
ing the emergency manager the power to negotiate and approve new 
agreements, but not the power to break existing contracts)188 is strong 
enough to change the chemistry of negotiations with public employee 
unions.  Emergency managers and mayors already wield the threat of 
bankruptcy to extract concessions on existing collective bargaining 
agreements. Indeed, unions have yielded extremely large concessions 
 
 187. To the extent that meetings between disgruntled local officials and an anoint-
ed replacement are bound to be contentious, they should be conducted with formal 
mediation.   
 188. See R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 45-9-9.   
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in areas ranging from pensions to health care benefits.  In Central 
Falls, for instance, the emergency manager used the sword granted by 
the Rhode Island law and the threat of bankruptcy to secure union 
agreement to pensions cuts of 50% and service budget cuts of 40%.189  
These cuts caused tremendous financial disruption and stress for pub-
lic employee families and pensioners.190  When estimating the added 
value of the Michigan law’s collective bargaining repeal features, one 
must inevitably factor in the cost of litigation that will follow on state 
and federal contracts clause grounds, among others. 
Structural Reform Processes.  At least as important as ongoing 
communication between an emergency manager and the city is the 
principle that with the centralization of state power should come 
changes to structural conditions that are limiting a city’s recovery po-
tential.  This can take two forms: economic benefits and structural re-
forms.  As for economic benefits, traditionally, state receiverships 
have come with increased financial support from the state.  It is a 
simple carrot and stick formula: bailout funds and loans come with 
mandatory reform.  For instance, the state receivership in the city of 
Chelsea, Massachusetts, discussed in the previous section, came with 
substantial state funding.  This included emergency bailout funds 
along with annual state contributions that funded no less than half of 
the city’s budget.191  That meant that not only did Chelsea’s elected 
officials consent to state assistance, but the state assumed financial 
accountability when it took over political power during city’s recov-
ery.  By deviating from this traditional model, Michigan and Rhode 
Island seem to be expressing the view that the current revenue pic-
ture of the city is adequate to provide for public safety, debt service, 
and other core expenses—if only, the laws suggest, the city had com-
petent management.  A more encompassing view of the causes of a 
fiscal emergency recognizes that, like the notion of an “emergency” 
manager itself, the fiscal crisis can eventually pass if struggling locali-
ties receive additional funds. 
State bailout funds need not come without policy strings attached, 
however.  In fact, Michigan itself, under Governor Snyder, is an ex-
ample of how to tie funding to local policy.  The Governor has put in 
place a broad state policy agenda of significant fiscal reform objec-
tives  for all local governments, with an emphasis on encouraging ser-
vice consolidation, improving transparency in local government fi-
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nance, and—of greatest focus for the governor—reducing local gov-
ernment employee compensation costs.  After revoking the past stat-
utory revenue-sharing system for state aid to local governments, 
Governor Snyder replaced it with an “Economic Vitality Incentive 
Program” that transforms state aid to local governments in two ways: 
it reduces the maximum allowable state funding to 67% of a local 
government’s 2010 funding, and it establishes three domains of per-
formance criteria that must be met to “earn” each one-third incre-
ment of allowable state support.192  With a similar model, the state 
can render the city eligible for bailout funds and financing tools like 
tax increment financing directed toward the city’s long-term fiscal 
health—for instance, to support a specific land redevelopment plan to 
enhance the city’s future revenue picture.   
The state should also use the lever of financial coercion to support 
formation of a regional council to facilitate structural changes that 
promote financial sustainability.  The council should be composed of 
officials from the state, the municipality (including both the emergen-
cy manager and an elected official), neighboring municipalities, and 
the township or county government.  The council would be charged 
with considering long-term structural reform at the regional level, 
particularly service sharing, consolidation, merger, dissolution, and 
revenue-sharing.  Any resulting deals developed within this body 
could be rewarded with front-end subsidization by the state as an in-
centive for cooperation.  Such coordination would support the goal of 
local defragmentation, which has become critical in Michigan and 
other states, and it would permit long-term thinking about the way 
that a city’s existing borders may impede recovery. 
 
 192. See Ryan Stanton, Snyder Tells Cities to Consolidate, Reduce Employee 
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sury/0,1607,7-121-1751_2197-259414--,00.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2012).  The per-
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ment contributions, minimum healthcare contributions by employees, and other 
measures. See Stanton, supra; see also, Kristin Longley, Flint Working on Gov. Rick 
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Oversight. Given extreme powers and relatively strong insulation 
from public scrutiny, oversight of these positions is critical.  State 
treasury departments must closely audit receivers’ work and out-
comes against objective standards. 
Termination of the Receivership.  The concept of a fiscal “emer-
gency” implies that it is temporary.  Indeed, the fact that these receiv-
erships are intended to be temporary is the most important argument 
for the legitimate suspension of a city charter and elected govern-
ment.  Yet, Michigan and Rhode Island did not include sunset provi-
sions for the reinstatement of local governance.  Such legislation 
should include explicit termination or public reauthorization provi-
sions.  Just as passive dissolution laws include a statutory period (usu-
ally five years) after which inactivity matures into dissolution by op-
eration of law,193 state receivership laws should mark the point where 
and processes by which local democracy recovers. 
CONCLUSION 
Where budget cuts are necessary, should we cut local government? 
The new generation of municipal insolvency legislation signified by 
the Michigan and Rhode Island laws represents an intrusion so deep 
into local governance that it constitutes temporary dissolution of the 
local democracy—its charter and elected government both.  As such, 
it constitutes a form of democratic dissolution in which the legal city 
and its borders survive, but the territory no longer enjoys local self-
rule.  While dissolution and receiverships do not give a fresh start in 
relation to creditors the way that Chapter 9 does, they do offer a 
chance for genuine restructuring.  In that way, the Michigan and 
Rhode Island laws take the worst of dissolution—its loss of local 
democratic self government—without its upside potential for struc-
tural reform to the revenue picture that supports public health, safety 
and welfare.  The comparison to dissolution highlights the fact that 
under the Michigan and Rhode Island laws, the state absorbs the gov-
ernance, but not the territory, its people’s service needs, or its reve-
nue constraints.  The city governed by the emergency manager is thus 
a ward of the state in terms of independence and self-government, but 
not so in terms of money.  Instead, these and future state receivership 
laws should be designed to address the causes of fiscal distress beyond 
local leadership failures or the dominance of special interests.  Such 
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bills should pursue the amelioration of short-term crises as well as 
address the need for long-term reform. 
